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Wednesday 8 December 2010

Would Indian Air Force have worked to induct 80-120 Tejas mk-1 fighter aircraft if there was no MMRCA program?


Would Indian Air Force have worked to induct 80-120 Tejas mk-1 fighter aircraft if there was no MMRCA program? 

Tejas near IOC; but induction?

The Tejas mk-1 is nearing completion of its development. LSP-5 on its first flight had all the gizmos that are going into the production model of Tejas. The frantic pace of missile tests, countermeasures, drop tank testing and gearbox certification says that all the hardware are in place. once the developer ADA verifies their performance, LSP-7,8 will be handed to IAF for testing and Trials. In such heightened expectations, the reality tends to get blurred.
The User IAF is not going to order anymore than 20-40 Tejas mk-1 aircraft. The IAF is expecting an improved Tejas mk-2 with various next generation systems such as Indian AESA radar, new engine and other stuff. So whatever we are have developed and testing now would be no more than demonstration of technological competence. Knowing the User's past attitude towards induction of weapon systems, preferring a completely developed product to a phased upgrade approach. The platform Tejas mk-1 now is will be carried forward the same till there is any dire need for upgrade. The programmed induction of Tejas Mk-2 could suffer this same inertia hence runs the danger of being held hostile to failures in AESA, other development efforts.

MRCA requirement, developments and relevance to Tejas

By 2001, the Indian Air Force had projected a requirement for 126 multi-role combat aircrafts and approached the MOD for the mirage-2000. The proposal was shot down and told to wait for Tejas which had just made its initial flight. It was expected to fill up some 400 number of combat aircraft in IAF. Besides the IAF had just inked a deal to licence assemble 140 Su-30 mki multi-role aircrafts in HAL, during the evaluation process in which the mirage-2000 had been found to be costly but low on performance compared to Su-30. Yet seeking the same plane for another requirement was a choice that seemed prudent in IAF eyes. But not for the GOI which had further plans such as lobbying for the LFI design with Russia. But change of guard in centre and consensus with Russians on Su T-50 for PAKFA resulted in favour of acquiring a single engine fighter as MRCA to make up for shortfalls that result from prolonged Tejas development. This was the MRCA program in 2006.
Fast forward to 2010, we have Tejas program staring at IOC around Dec 2010- early 2011. But IAF is not going to order no more than 20-40 of the planes.
The reason or perhaps excuse given is redesign of air-intake, which might have taken a year or so to modify, test and certify. But add to that air show tricks sorry, combat manoeuvres cannot be performed in the present aircraft configuration; the culprit GE supplied F404 f2j3 engines that produced 50/75 KN of thrust. Anyway Kaveri Engine which was conceived to produce 13% more thrust was holding the Tejas programme to its hostage hence delinked from the initial prototypes and production models. These in turn were decided to be powered by GE F404 IN20 engines which produced 85 KN in bench testing, just as much the GTRE gtx-35vs Kaveri had hoped to achieve. IAF after this order would order no more and required the aircraft to have a new engine, which necessitated changes to fuselage, add to that larger wing with heavier load, add to that more internal fuel naturally resulting from wing and fuselage modification. All these design changes have been factored and a time frame for production has been pushed back to 2018. In a nut shell, technology that had been developed for 2010 IOC has been effectively put off till 2018, while keeping the developer busy all the while.
Below are sources that point out IAF wanted the Tejas to be better than Mirage 2000 leading to Mk-2 requirement, yet compromising for less capable MRCA way back in 2005

Is the IAF justified in making such demands on Tejas also needs to be analysed?
When it was realised that Tejas would not be available post 2005, RFI was released to generally accepted light category fighters namely F-16 bk-52, Mirage 2000, Mig-29 OVT and Jas -39 C/D Gripen. Of all the above, the only aircraft very contemporary and had a similar profile to Tejas was Gripen. Branded as cheap and affordable, the aircraft was built with the same goals Tejas was developed to meet, amazingly with the same technology needing to be developed. But Gripen induction started in 1996, while Tejas still languished for first flight. Thus procuring 126 Gripens would have been ideal. But the pace of the Indian bureaucracy meant that Tejas program caught up, confident in Tejas grew and outpaced capability that had been achieved by the four contenders. IAF finding itself in a hard place of not being able to shun Tejas from the competition did something detrimental to the very essence of quick procurement, it raised the bar. Thus the Max takeoff weight of 20 tons had to go, bringing two other manufacturers raising the competition to MMRCA. Theoretically had the IAF selected Gripen, it would have been akin to acknowledging its own lack of technical competence. As we know other than Gripen, most other aircraft were fabricated around a different engine than Tejas’s GE F404. SAAB chose F404 for Gripen, whose empty weight after development stands at 6500 kg and max takeoff weight at 12,500 kg with a combat radius of 800 km. The Aircraft has been accepted into Swedish air force. On contrast IAF wanted a 5500 kg fighter with the same engine, same take off wt and same combat radius. When Saab with all its experience has preferred to stick to 6500 kg empty weight fighter even after using 30% composites, it was not pragmatic to ask ADA to roll out an even lighter fighter of the same capabilities. Sadly IAF did exactly that and ADA with its limited experience has maxed out the weight reduction possible for a machine of this complexity, since 45% composite already employed. But IAF remains stubborn not to accept Tejas or make sensible choices that may expose its past unrealistic expectations from contemporary technology. Yes, I agree ADA was a laggard in the testing front, but that should not become a reason for continuing to rely on imports. "Of course, we have problems with our LCA but we should be working to solve that. Why should we be so keen to become dependent?" - vice admiral Raman Puri, Indian Navy. A lot has been made of DRDO’s lack of clarity in functioning, But IAF is let off the hook for not supporting indigenous programs just like that.
While in case of MRCA IAF is willing to compromise with 1970s airframe like the Super Viper, there is little doubt a latest airframe like Tejas or Gripen would prove to be superior. The last time IAF abandoned Indian programme HF-24 Marut follow on to go for Jaguar, we ended with a 1960s airframe, which became obsolete soon after induction whose original orders still languish in HAL till date. With such circumstances regularly repeating themselves, do we need foreign weapons systems that would soon be abandoned by their manufacturer once new programs start, while the IAF languishes with it for half a century in service?

Medium category aircraft the IAF so desperately lacks

The medium class of aircraft the IAF so desperately lacks. Funny that of all the Air Forces only IAF evaluates its aircraft in terms of weight instead of capabilities. Just curious, of the 600+ air staff specifications, is weighing the aircraft in a balance there, too?

yes, the Super Hornet's or Eurofighter's capabilities cannot be mimicked by Tejas, So is the same that Tejas’s low development, initial procurement and operating costs cannot be beaten by others. If there are specifically three categories heavy, medium and light, i take it we are arguing all of their capabilities are mutually exclusive. If that was the case then we are actually implying an invading Pakistani F-16 cannot be intercepted by Su-30 or tejas, if pronto F-16 was a medium category fighter. Some have argued that MMRCA is going to give us a premier strike fighter that makes me doubt if the Su-30 has any air to surface capability at all. But it seems according to wiki , we are wrong. If we still aspire to be right then the following munitions hanging from pylons are no more than stars, bells and whistles hanging from a Christmas tree.

Air to Surface Missiles:

* 3 × Kh-59ME TV guided standoff Missile, 115 km
* 3 × Kh-59MK active radar homing anti-ship missile, 285 km
* 4 × Kh-35 Anti-Ship Missile, 130 km
* 1 × PJ-10 Brahmos Supersonic Cruise Missile,300 km
* 6 × Kh-31P/A anti-radar missile, 70 km
* 6 × Kh-29T/L laser guided missile, 30 km
* 4 × S-8 rocket pods (80 unguided rockets)
* 4 × S-13 rocket pods (20 unguided rockets)

Bombs:

* 8 × KAB-500L laser guided bombs
* 3 × KAB-1500L laser guided bombs
* 8 × FAB-500T dumb bombs
* 28 × OFAB-250-270 dumb bombs
* 32 × OFAB-100-120 dumb bombs
* 8 × RBK-500 cluster bombs

The is a sense of humour in the strike capability argument, the Eurofighter Nations themselves still depend on legacy tornados for their strike role and we are offered a lethal strike aircraft in the Eurofighter.

The issue of light and heavy fighters came about first in the VVS when PFI programme was launched to counter American F-15. The program would have resulted only in Su-27, but since fielding the aircraft in large numbers was cost prohibitive, an aircraft of knocked down capability for point defence, at the lowest cost mig-29 was also developed. Similarly it was no more than pure economics that prompted the development of XF-16. The same F-16 evolved from a fighter in its inception to a venerable Fighter bomber in the 1990s. Since fielding fighters in large numbers is not a requirement for Europeans they have reduced their inventory towards a single type of aircraft. Even the United States with interests spread all over the globe, due to which it needs to acquire diverse capabilities to operate across the entire spectrum, is desperate to shift to a common platform for all its services. Please don't point out delays in JSF program, to justify MMRCA is correct. The US policy makers have made a decision and stick to it to make it work. While the GOI has left it to IAF, whose motto is "I have no satisfaction whatsoever and the sky is the limit" wake up people there is no sky, it’s an illusion. For those who believe the Semi-stealth of MMRCA is a capability, IAF rejected twin-engine LCA with semi-stealth capabilities which was called medium combat aircraft for sometime in the recent past, which should intrigue something. There is no new capability that a medium category is set to bestow upon us. There is no job that the Su-30 cannot accomplish that the MMRCA can.

How could a new generation Su-30 mki beat each and every MMRCA contender out there?
Personally, I do not believe in generations of different aircraft, or an aircraft itself belongs to a particular time and no other. Sure enough it is a good tactic to get aboard the general public. When we had the MRCA requirement of 126 aircraft, if we had commenced a programme to replace a large parts of the metal airframes with composites on Su-30 mki, with a commitment of 90 aircraft, in a sort of a Sukoi Design Bureau-NAL-HAL consortium, Even without having to change the engines we would have had a 4.75 gen Su-30MkI with frontal radar cross section (RCS) reduction comparable with Typhoon or Super Hornet yet more agile and manoeuvrable due to the raw power of AL-31 engines. The aircraft would have weighed lesser, yet with significantly greater structural strength and payload capabilities. We could say it is a 4.75 gen aircraft to fancy it, But professionals can see through these to strip every aircraft of this gimmick. Generational classification is qualitative, but weapons manufacturers use it as an advertising slogan to market their equipment to baboons in the highest echelons of decision making. Maybe the armed forces can realise it, but IAF was too stubborn to see sensibly, they were rejoicing the victory parade of the mirage 2000 and believed it was the aircraft to run over the LCA Tejas.
One reason perhaps the IAF seeks to incorporate a western origin aircraft may be due to the fact that Russian supplies of air to ground munitions flopped big time in Kargil, but the su-30 deal had already gone forward before and the IAF still preferred to have a wholly western fighter guaranteeing best of all the world in its midst. The service chiefs who strategise do not care about logistics; engineers in the IAF are burdened with the task and paying for it does not come from IAF chief’s pay check, it comes from the tax payer’s pocket. The Su-30 deal has had its share of problems, of the 40+ complaints only a handful were solved by Sukoi, is that a reason to go for a western fighter? Does not seem so after the Hawk deal, reports of French arm-twisting in supply of mirage spares. At least we had 100% TOT with Sukoi; in this deal we only get 60%. The platform whatever we buy is going to be the summation of a train wreck of problems that we faced with Jaguar, mig-27 etc.

Legacy of HAL at stake

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Bangalore through hook or crook has become South Asia's largest or perhaps the sole Aerospace enterprise, courtesy - Socialist, Spineless politicians and bureaucratic Babus. By late 1970s, after consolidation of economy by Indira Ghandi, HAL had become the alpha and omega of Indian Aerospace. It was showered with Ratna awards, its top brass regularly received national awards, but it hardly did anything to further Indian Aerospace Industry or facilitate academic institutions to participate in R&D. It was an end in itself. HAL by then had settled into a nice rhythm where first India buys some planes off the shelf from Russia then gets licence to manufacture them in HAL under Transfer of Technology(TOT), to offset the Russian leverage India again buys an aircraft with similar capabilities from Europe which is again licensed to be manufactured by HAL.
The hot gas produced by Licence production kept HAL going until ADA was formed. Instead of working with the agency, HAL considered it a challenge to its turf which meant ADA had to hire people outside HAL and kept functioning not as close as they need to have. Though the prime contractor for Tejas, until recently HAL's participation in the programme has been minimal. To maintain its Technological excellence on par with ADA, HAL has looked no further than its dirty old method of Licence production through TOT from Western Europe. I wonder what it stands to gain that the Su-30 mki licence production with 100 % TOT couldn't give, that it needs 60% TOT from MMRCA contenders. One reason could be that the idle manufacturing facility that catered to Jaguar assembly. The top to bottom hierarchy in HAL is only bent on holding onto their jobs while keeping their bigger heads intact. Probably their Cool idea is replacing Russian mig-27 line with Su-30 now Jaguar line with MMRCA to duplicate the previous cycle, how much pathetic can this agency get.
The worst part is they can't even leave upgrade programs alone, e.g. RD-33 engines for mig-29 upgrade, Jaguar upgrade. They couldn't even leave the LCA Tejas Mk-2 programme out of licensing.
Below is the extract of news that partly attributes to delays in starting Tejas Mk-2 programme

Surprisingly, or perhaps not so surprisingly, ADA has taken a year to issue the RFP. ADA officials tell The Hindu that the delay was caused because HAL butted in to say they would assemble the engines. ADA, already embarrassed by project delays was keen to procure all of them off the shelf.

Though the RFP stipulates only assembly, not license manufacture, HAL is keen to work on manufacturing technologies such as single crystal blade and blade cooling that will come with these engines. HAL of course has nothing to show as achievements for all the fighter engines that it has assembled in the past.
http://kuku.sawf.org/News/59037.aspx

An intellectual viewpoint on factors harming Tejas programme
What if the situation we find ourselves in is due to institutional inertia in which a particular lobby has thrived due to imports. The lobby toils to forge together forces from within IAF, MOD and HAL amiable to imports from western partners, thus feel their clout shrinking due to a successful Tejas programme. Since Tejas won’t die a natural death anytime soon. They are desperately trying to box out Tejas program and the medium weight category has been their brainchild. They feel their influence that derives from dealings with western military powers being threatened by Tejas’s successful induction that they have decided to muscle out Tejas using MMRCA contenders. The MMRCA was legitimate till it was MRCA, as it was realised Tejas would soon catch up with the contenders by the time of induction, the bar has been raised over and over and we can see it’s been a desperate attempt by these congregation of big headed baboons to get even with their foreign colleagues and give a sense of importance among foreign military powers using buying power, whatever that means. This is clear amateurish, sluggish short-sightedness. The nexus of forces forged by western lobby is hard-pressed to introduce a platform that is going to be outdated by 2017 according to P S Subramanian, ADA, unless we pay for AESA radar development, engine upgrade etc if not directly then through increased unit procurement costs. We are looking forward through 2020 for FGFA and 2025 for AMCA. Introducing three other platforms in-between, 2010 Tejas mk1, MMRCA in 2014 and Tejas mk-2 in 2017, is it really worth the trouble? I would rather have the aircraft make smooth transition within the ambit of the Tejas programme, Tejas aircraft in the present configuration in 2010, redesign intake for re-engine F414 Tejas in 2014, then complete the growth in 2017 with larger wings, this way the aircraft capabilities would have increased to catch up with the MMRCA candidates, on whom IAF now is prepared to spend a fortune. Induction and strategy making would be incremental as well, besides we would have a world class fighter for export as an extension of hard power, whose production can continue till AMCA production hits the lines.
As things stand now it is not the case, with a tough stance the services have taken towards developing indigenous capabilities, the industry even with the involvement of private sector would find it hard pressed to gain any share of the armed forces shopping spree expected to be $ 112 billion over the next 10 years. One reason is perhaps is the lack of ownership and responsibility bestowed upon the services by the GOI. The other day in a press statement the IAF chief declares he would accept no less than fully indigenous AESA radar for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA). Is he not aware that the AESA radar development is a co-development venture for which DRDO is in search of a foreign partner, or is he vetting out his displeasure at the joint-venture? Whatever it is, it is surely not in the Nation’s interests.
Vested Public Relations Sabotage
Even at this Twilight hour, there are vested interests that try desperately with sensationalistic and so authentically realistic propaganda to destroy the Programme's public image. But has such a thing happened in countries like Sweden, Brazil when they tried to invest in Systems that cater to their particular demand. Their achievements stand in testament to their decisions which in stark contrast to India's. Below given some of media reports during recent times,


It still will not be the fighter the air force had agreed to accept for limited squadron service. Performance specifications that the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) has not been able to attain include sustained turn rate, speed at low altitude, angle of attack and certain weapon delivery profiles. Exactly how far off the performance is from the specification remains classified.

According to sources, the first 40 ‘Tejas’ LCA to be inducted in the Indian Armed Forces will cost roughly $33.3 million excluding its development cost. As for the development cost of the ‘Tejas’ LCA, the overall figure is to the tune of $3.8 billion which is a 3000 per cent hike from the cost during the conception of the project over two decades ago. The sanctioned cost includes the fighter’s naval variant, which will run till December 2018.

http://indiadefenceonline.com/2315/lca-faces-huge-cost-escalation/




All of these factors have led me to only a single question

Debate Question: Would IAF have worked with ADA & MOD to induct 80-120 Tejas in Mk-1 configuration if there was no MRCA alias MMRCA competition?

Some wishful thinking on my part that one or combination of the below mentioned factors topples the MMRCA program
The Gripen comes out as the one that meets all parameters and emerges L1.What if the Government was so hell bent on Tejas (or the woe-betide Sweden syndrome) that it refused to entertain an aircraft that would duplicate its capabilities.

The evaluation report is scrutinised in parliament that ends in a JPC which results in a conclusion "the capabilities afforded by the newer aircrafts are offset by their higher procurement and operating costs, thus recommends air staff to buy Mk-1 to plug gaps till mk-2 is developed"

A CAG report implicates rules had been bent and the purpose of the procurement had been compromised by waiting till 2015 to induct and with unit prices at $100+ million was unacceptable to the exchequer.

The IAF has a new chief with Engineering and operational logistics background and he  sees that Tejas programme would eventually meets its operational requirements perfectly, goes in for standardisation. IAF negotiates with the manufactures that had specific equipment that stood apart from the rest in the trials to be integrated with Tejas programme, and absolves the MMRCA to escape complexion of logistics.
           
I wish the saner heads in GOI, opposition and defence services come together to nullify the MMRCA whose decision is to come up in mid 2011 to hit the final nail on Tejas’s coffin.
yours truly

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