The Indian experience of buying weapons from America is not smooth. We have recently found problems in weapons-locating radars of the United States. The American transfer of technology means that they will build, they will sell the item and keep you on a short leash as far as spare parts and support system are concerned.
My contention is that as long as we don't have a deep political understanding with the US, it is not advisable to get into a deep defence relationship. The Asia Pacific is America's concern, but India's concern is Pakistan, Afghanistan and China. Why do we need certain defence agreements with US that give us inter-operability in far away shores?
Further, growing Indo-US defense ties suggest that the Indian government has given up on the goal of self-reliance. It is now merely a political slogan. Their excuse is lame.
They say the Defense Research and Development Organisation has not delivered. I don't think critics of the DRDO have analysed what is not delivered. There is no synergy in the ministry of defence. There is no synergy between the decision-making structures of the government. Army headquarter is one silo, the naval and air force headquarters are separate silos. The ministry of defence works on its own. There is a very loose coordination attempted at the individual level without a formal structure. There is a firewall between the production and the research side of the weapons making systems. There is hardly any mission statement from the armed forces. That doesn't come because you don't have a national security strategy and its stated goals.
'Army's shopping from the US doesn't make sense'
The Indian army's shopping from the US or Israel doesn't make sense because our army has not issued a mission statement yet. I think our so-called shopping of state-of-the-art weapons don't make sense till the National Security Council and the office of Chairman, Chief of Defense Staff function in coordination. Both these institutions are resisted or just ignored.
The Indian armed forces are apolitical; why there should not be a chief of defence staff? How will he become more powerful than politicians?
Today in cyber warfare, we don't have joint strategies of the three wings. I have seen meetings between the chiefs of the three defence wings. They don't produce any doctrines. They function on a limited agenda.
When the issue of buying of defense equipment from America comes, they talk about 'latest' and 'high technology.' These are just subjective words. What India needs is to fight efficiently with its competitors. We are not in competition with the US or Europe. We are and we should compare ourselves with our neighbours.
I have not read a professional joint mission need of Indian forces in 40 years. So, who is pushing the forces to buy such costly arms? 'Why should we go for American aircraft'
In absence of solid internal defence coordination of the three wings of the air force, army and navy, how can India sign the Communication Interoperability & Security Memorandum of Agreement, Logistics Support agreement, End Users Agreement kind of pacts with America? Some of these agreements will allow the inter-operability of Indian forces with the US, but what about inter-operability within our own forces?
If we sign such agreements with the US then we will need double set of equipments: One to read American algorithms and one to read ours. Why do we need inter-operability that the Americans want so much? Are we going to fight with Pakistan or any other country along with the US? Surely, we don't want to join American forces doing the dirty work of intervention operations? The Indian armed forces should remain independent of such tie-ups, which are not backed by political understanding of the highest order.
In my assessment all that the Indian defence forces need is updated Sukhoi- 30s and Light Combat Aircraft. We should keep modernising the LCAs; they are as good as the Mirage 2000.
Why should we go for American- made 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft? Each US-made MMRCA will cost us over $ 70 million while the LCA cost us only $ 26 million. Why should we spend so much money? Of course, we have problems with our LCA but we should be working to solve that. Why should we be so keen to become dependent? And, remember, when you build the LCA indigenously, you are building an institution.
I can say only that I disagree with my own community when they want to go for US- or Israel-made weapons and completely bind themselves with them. I know for sure that in 2003 the Air Force only wanted the Mirage 2000. Why don't you upgrade it? I think that is what the Indian Air Force needs to fight China, Pakistan or any other neighbour if need be. The Indian government doesn't have second professional advice. It is totally in the hands of service chiefs who many times don't agree with each other. That disturbs the country's research and development and upsets production infrastructure.
'India and US' political goals do not match'
In India, there is no systematic method to produce joint mission requirements. We don't draw joint technological plans with long-term perspectives. India doesn't have a technological commission to cater to needs of the defence services.
At this rate, in the long term, our dependence on the US will increase. Indian taxpayers will pay much more than what you should be paying for the capabilities being created. I think we will feel sorry when we have to use those capabilities.
Importantly, if the US and India's political goals do not match, then US made equipment capabilities will be much reduced, with problems of spare parts, upgradation and other legal restrictions on technologies.
There are many lobbies working around in New Delhi representing the British, French, Americans, Russians, etc. I believe they should not influence us. Even foreign aircraft come only after 10 or so years don't blame indigenous efforts to develop them that take that kind of time.
Second, we must see what we can afford.
Three, we should not have a fetish for state-of-the-art equipment if we can mange with what we have or what we can get with help of the DRDO. Also, is what you are buying really state of the art? I don't think so. I have seen negotiations for a few things going on for decades, still you say you are buying the latest! We have made ballistic missiles to ballistic missiles systems. I don't think there is any technology left that doesn't go into that system.
'We must promote self-reliance'
The American system of selling weapons to India under Foreign Military Sales has kept middlemen away, but I don't think it's helpful in getting access to spares and other services. I think CISMOA should be a no-go area for Indian defense services.
Being poor is no crime. But being a slave is a crime. How can you file status report to Americans under the LSA?
On one side we are losing politically when in Af-Pak policy the Americans keep India out while allowing Pakistan to have strategic depth, but still we want to sign defence agreements with them.
I agree that the US is a powerful country. We should have defence ties with it. But we must promote self-reliance. China is doing today what it wants because it's not dependent on others. You can't be even a sub-regional power if you are totally dependent on outside powers for your weapons. We can't even have military diplomacy.
Also, China's official defense budget is three times our own and their procurement costs are much lower than ours because they have much greater levels of indigenisation. So, when we are buying from abroad our needs cannot clearly help to bridge the growing asymmetries in capability. We must be cautious of the factor of affordability when planning to buy from America or any other country. We have to choose appropriate strategies to meet our mission needs and not some hypothetical 'state-of-the-art' printed in the brochure of weapons manufacturing companies.
As told to Sheela Bhatt
Monday 22 November 2010
Project management in India involving Ministry of Defence, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Foreign aircraft manufacturer and the most important but no stake holder -Indian Air Force
Shamsher [Jaguar]
Capable of delivering nuclear weapons, the Jaguars were first inducted into the IAF from Britain in 1979 and subsequently manufactured by HAL under licence. French and Israeli companies are also part of the upgradation programme. Advanced radars, navigation, weapon and electronic warfare systems and precision-guided munitions have been fitted with these deep penetration aircraft which are poised to augment the capabilities of the blue force.By the mid 1970s, the IAF was clearly in need of urgent re-equipment decisions. First off the mark was selection of the Jaguar strike fighter, to meet the IAF's urgent Deep Penetration Strike Aircraft (DPSA) requirement, to replace the Canberra and Hunter still soldiering on in this exacting role.
After many years of evaluation and negotiation, the Anglo-French fighter was contracted for, an interim batch of ex-RAF Jaguars being accepted to re-equip No. 14 Squadron. IAF pilots and technicians received conversion training with the RAF and British Aerospace in Lossiemouth, Coltishall and Warton before ferrying the first Jaguars to India in July 1979. These were followed by a batch of U.K. built Jaguars to re-equip No. 5 Squadron even as simultaneously, HAL prepared for production of the aircraft, its powerplants, avionics and accessories in India.
The Indian Ministry of Defense approved in October 1978 acquisition of 150 Jaguars and concluded two agreements with the aircraft manufacturer in April 1979. While 40 Jaguars were imported in a fly away condition, the remaining 110 aircraft were to be licenced manufactured by the HAL (Hindustan Aeronautics Limited) during 1982-89 in a phased manner. The direct supply aircraft were equipped with first generation Marconi inertial navigation and attack system named NAVWASS, which had low reliability and was grossly outdated. The Ministry, immediately after induction, had to sanction development of a second generation display attack ranging inertial navigation system named DARIN for its integration on HAL built Jaguars. The Ministry also sanctioned an ambitious retromodification program to upgrade the NAVWASS equipped direct supply Jaguar aircraft.
By the mid-80s, the Jaguar was in service with Nos. 5, 14, 16 and 27 Squadrons while a flight of No.6 Squadron was equipped with the Maritime Jaguar carrying the new generation Sea Eagle anti-ship sea-skimming missile. The Jaguar strike fighter was equipped also with Magic air-to-air missiles on unique overwing pylons, featured advanced nay-attack systems and able to carry formidable warload till the far ends of the sub-continent.
The Ministry curtailed in 1982 the indigenous manufacture program from 110 to 76 aircraft on the grounds that the design philosophy of the Jaguar aircraft was of the sixties and the manufacturer of the aircraft had stopped production of the aircraft. However, the Ministry had to reverse its decision and it sanctioned procurement of 15 additional Jaguars from HAL in September 1988 after six years of curtailment of the indigenous manufacture program.
The Indian Air Force had some 35 Jaguars equipped with outdated first generation navigation and attack system called NAVWASS for about two decades. Their retromodification with third generation DARIN INGPS was sanctioned belatedly in November 1996 at a cost of Rs.158 crore for completion by 2000-01 was yet to take off and was not expected to be completed before 2006. The contracts for five sub-systems with foreign vendors for this program were at a stand still due to non-finalisation of mission computer by HAL as the imported sub-systems were to be designed around this computer. In the meantime, 14 aircraft had to be grounded for periods ranging from 2 to 26 months due to prolonged unserviceability.
Air HQ in March 1995 unequivocally stated that if a retromod program was not undertaken, it would necessitate phasing out of NAVWASS Jaguars from the Air Force inventory earlier than desired due to their poor operational reliability in the present configuration. Audit scrutiny disclosed that while the Jaguar squadrons were hard pressed for NAVWASS specific items which had depleted considerably, Air HQ had decided not to procure additional NAVWASS kits stating that an upgradation program was on the anvil. The action of the Air HQ, however, proved abortive as lack of cohesive planning and foresight on its part led to grounding of 14 aircraft at a Jaguar operating base for a period ranging from 2 to 26 months as of June 2000 primarily due to deficiency and prolonged unserviceability of the NAVWASS specific items.
The Ministry concluded contract for procurement of maritime radar for the Jaguar aircraft, in replacement of the existing outdated agave radars, after four years of projection of requirement by Air Force resulting in an extra expenditure of US$ 1.12 million, which was avoidable. The Jaguar maritime fleet had to operate with old agave radars whose maintenance was becoming more and more difficult. Three out of five maritime Jaguars were lying unserviceable since March-June 1999.
Apathy of Air HQ/ Ministry to speed up the acquisition of auto pilot system for Jaguar aircraft was operationally detrimental. The Air Force not only lost four Jaguar aircraft costing Rs.141.40 crore in serious flying accidents, three pilots also died in these accidents. The auto pilots are unlikely to be fitted on Jaguars at least till June 2002.
Integration and flight trials of the laser designator pods procured at a cost of Rs.95 crore has been delayed by 20 months. This would, apart from delaying the fleet modification of Jaguars, also impose operational limitations to the aircraft fleet. In the mean time, warranty of three pods valuing Rs.15.33 crore had expired. The Jaguars would not be able to undertake missions with laser designator pods in the absence of auto pilots, a mandatory requirement was not likely to be available before June 2002.
The CCS approved a proposal of the Air Force in May 1996 for procurement of 15 laser designator pods with thermal imagery for fitment on 10 Jaguars and 5 Mirage-2000 aircraft and modification of 30 Jaguar aircraft for carrying the pods at a total cost of Rs.125 crore. The Ministry concluded a contract with foreign firm ‘D’ in November 1996 for procurement of 15 laser designator pods with thermal imagery at a total cost of US $ 27.11 million, equivalent to Rs.95 ( 1 US $ = Rs.35) crore to be delivered between March 1998 and February 1999 in two phases. Flight trails and certification of laser designator pods on Jaguar aircraft was delayed by 20 months. However, there had been delay in delivery of pods due to delays in conclusion of flight tests and certification of pods on Jaguar and Mirage-2000 aircraft. The flight test and certification on Jaguar aircraft, which was planned to be conducted by March 1998, was completed by the ASTE (Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment), only in December 1999, after a delay of 20 months.
The plan of the Air Force to equip the Jaguar fleet with self protection jammer, a critical electronic warfare equipment, has been jeopardised even after an expenditure of Rs 184 crore. An initial delay of 24 months in mock-up installation not only forced the Ministry to re-schedule the delivery of jammers from July 1999 to July 2001, a realistic time frame for fleet modification is yet to emerge affecting thereby, the operational capabilities of the Air Force.
With a Jaguar crashing in Ambala in May 2002, the Indian Air Force has lost an average of one of these deep penetration strike aircraft each year in accidents since they were inducted in service in 1979. A total of 20 Jaguars had been lost as of 2002, with the three previous crashes taking place in and around Ambala, which is the base for some of the operational Jaguar squadrons. 1999 was the worst year for the Jaguars when four of these aircraft were lost in Gorakhpur, Pune and Patiala. As of June 2005, a total of 28 Jaguars had been lost in accidents.
The Jaguars were the first type of aircraft that had flown overseas. The Indian Air Force deployed them in an overseas exercise, Cope Thunder in Alaska, USA last year. Speaking on the occasion of the induction, Defence Minister said, “The nation must equip itself for electronic warfare”. The Air Chief said that the upgradation of Jaguar was a noteworthy step towards self-reliance. HAL Chairman, Mr Ashok Baweja said Mig-27 and Sea Harrier would be upgraded next. Mr N Dharam Singh, Chief Minister of Karnataka also spoke on the occasion.
In 2004, the Indian Air Force signed a contract with Sextant to completely upgrade the Jaguar autopilot system. Sextant would supply a state-of-the-art modular, digital autopilot for the Jaguars, derived from autopilots already developed for the Mirage 2000-9 and the Nimrod 2000. Autopilot integration would be carried out in jointly with the Indian air force and HAL. The new autopilot would increase the aircraft's ground attack capabilities, as well as enhance flight safety.
Nine upgraded twin-seater Jaguar fighters were inducted into Indian Air Force (IAF) on 15 July 2005 at a ceremony held at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Bangalore. Defence Minister, Mr Pranab Mukherjee handed over the aircraft to Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal SP Tyagi. The aircraft were upgraded by HAL.
The Jaguars of the Indian Air Force have always been a trusted war horse since the first Jaguar came to Ambala on July 27, 1979 and put in 25 years of yeoman service to the Indian Air Force. At the time of induction, Jaguar was considered to be the fastest aircraft and added a new dimension to air operations in the Indian sub-continent. Under an agreement with the Indian Air Force, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has been entrusted with the upgradation of Jaguars that would extend their life by another 15 years, through the year 2020.
In January 2009 Honeywell announced its F125IN engine, a 9850lbf (43.8kN) thrust engine that will deliver high performance, improved pilot safety, lower maintenance and outstanding reliability. "This thrust class engine is built around Honeywell's proven expertise in the design and production of aircraft systems, which is evident in the F125IN engine, an outstanding propulsion system for military aircraft," said Vicki Panhuise, Honeywell Vice President, Military Aircraft. "The engine will transform the Indian Air Force Jaguar aircraft by improving mission performance, enhancing pilot safety, reducing pilot workload, and reducing maintenance events and costs." The F125IN powerplant, which is currently being considered for the Indian Air Force Jaguar re-engining program, is significantly lighter and much more powerful than the aircraft's current engine. It has an advanced dual full-authority digital engine control (FADEC) system, modular construction, integrated engine health monitoring system and best in class thrust-to-weight ratio. In 2007 the F125IN was successfully demonstrated for the Indian Air Force in Bangalore. The engine is projected to save the Indian Air Force more than Rupees 7000 Crores ($1.5 billion) in life-cycle costs compared to other upgrade options being considered. The F125IN permits the Jaguar to perform missions never before possible with the current engine.
Saturday 20 November 2010
AT EASE WITH GREASE General Deepak Kapoor may seem like a terrible aberration. But BRIJESH PANDEY finds the rot runs deeper in the army
|
Friday 19 November 2010
The White Elephant in Tajikistan
| It was but four years ago that Ayni Airbase was set to become India’s first visible geopolitical move into Central Asia. What happened? | ||
By JOSHUA KUCERA Published :1 November 2010
In early September that year, Tajikistan’s president, Emomalii Rahmon, declared the base and its 3,200-metre runway to be open. And although information about the base is closely guarded by both the Indian and Tajik ministries of defence, it now appears that India will not use Ayni after all, depriving isolated, impoverished Tajikistan of the rent money and geopolitical clout it could have been gaining by allowing another country to use the base. And India remains without this foothold in Tajikistan, a mountainous country of about seven million, just north of Afghanistan. Tajikistan—the poorest corner of the former Soviet Union, and still unstable after a brutal civil war in the 1990s—holds a geographic position with obvious appeal to India, offering Delhi not only a strategic counterweight to Pakistan’s considerable influence in Afghanistan, but an airbase within striking distance of its troublesome neighbour. But India’s ambitions in Central Asia have been thwarted, according to many in the Tajik capital of Dushanbe, by Russia: Moscow does not want anyone else to use the base, though Tajikistan’s deteriorating relations with Russia have disinclined Dushanbe from wanting to host another Russian base in its territory. “They [members of the Tajikistan government] don’t know what to do with this airbase. We don’t need it for ourselves, but to give it to someone else would create problems with other countries,” said Faridoon Khodizoda, a political analyst in Dushanbe. The Russian Embassy in Dushanbe did not respond to requests for comment, and a spokesman at the Indian Embassy said he could not comment on Ayni, but referred questions to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Defence. They did not respond to requests for comment. India has renovated runways and hangars at Ayni, but the Indian government has never publically stated its longerterm intentions for the base. Reports in the Indian press have suggested that India hoped to base a squadron of MiG-29 fighter jets there, in an effort to bolster its clout in Central Asia and to counter Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. “Once called the white elephant of Asia, India’s strategic aspirations have now finally come of age,” wrote Shiv Aroor, an Indian journalist who obtained classified information about India’s plans in 2007. “The country’s first military base in a foreign country will be declared ready for use next month. Welcome to Ayni, Tajikistan, India’s first military outpost in a foreign land. Bare minutes from Tajikistan’s border with war-torn Afghanistan, the base gives India a footprint for the first time ever in the region’s troubled history.” Indian political analysts also raved about India’s bold foray into the strategically vital Central Asian region. “There are several reasons underpinning India’s interest in a base at Tajikistan,” wrote analyst Sudha Ramachandran in 2006. “It is close to areas where scores of camps for jihadist and anti-India terrorist groups are based, and it is in the proximity of territory where Pakistan and China are engaged in massive military co-operation. Besides, Tajikistan is in Central Asia, a gas-rich region in which India has growing interests.” Analysts of India’s military now say that those expectations may have been too ambitious. When the renovations began in 2004 and 2005, India did not have a clear plan as to how it would eventually establish a base at Ayni, according to one source close to the Indian armed forces, whose employer does not allow him to speak on the record. “The point, sadly, remains the same: while the Tajik government has kept doors open, at least in a limited sense, the government here hasn’t quite gotten its act together about precisely what or how to leverage the opportunity,” he said. Some analysts said that India’s foray into base politics was merely an attempt to act like the superpower it has not yet become. “India is playing a game,” said Imran Baig, a Washington, DC-based analyst of South Asian security. “To maintain a base with no aircraft is not expensive at all. But to deploy a high-tech fighter squadron full-time at a remote location far from the country of origin is a very, very costly affair and can only be afforded by superpowers.” Still, India appears to want to keep the question of its presence at Ayni open. India’s president, Pratibha Patil, visited Dushanbe last year, and Indian engineers continue to work on construction projects at the base, including a “hotel,” according to one worker at the base who spoke on condition of anonymity. But there were no Indian aircraft there, the worker said. Meanwhile, analysts in Dushanbe argue that Tajikistan’s government may have been courting India with the intention of playing Delhi off Moscow to exert a higher price for Russian usage of the base. Russia appears disinclined to allow India any access to the airfield. Russia’s defence minister, Anatoliy Serdyukov, said last year that Tajikistan and Russia would jointly utilise the base, but Tajikistan has never confirmed that. And Russia, which already maintains a large military base for its 201st Division at Dushanbe, does not appear interested in actually using Ayni, but merely in keeping other countries from using it, said Zafar Sufiyev, the editor-in-chief of Ozodagon, an independent weekly newspaper in Dushanbe. Neither does Tajikistan appear interested in allowing Russia to use the base. Tajikistan’s president, Emomalii Rahmon, recently suggested that Russia, which currently does not pay rent for the 201st Division base, should do so in the future. The two sides, however, agreed to put off that decision until 2014. Tajik-Russian relations have also been harmed by Moscow’s failure to support Dushanbe, either financially or diplomatically, in the construction of the Rogun Dam, which Tajikistan’s government sees as vital to its future economic security. “Rahmon is not independent enough to say ‘no’ to Russia, and he’s afraid to say ‘yes’ to anyone else,” said Saymuddin Dustov, an analyst in Dushanbe. “So he does nothing.” There has been speculation that the US, facing continuing uncertainty over the use of the Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan, might be interested in Ayni as a possible replacement. The Tajikistan government would allow the US to use Ayni at the right price, said Safiyev. “If the government gets more for it than the Americans pay for Manas, they’ll be interested,” he said. “It’s a market.” But the US has said it has no interest in using the base, and it’s not clear anymore whether India would be interested either. It appears that Russia may have made that decision for them. |
The crusade of Tehelka
India's cultural elite revive muckraking magazine
After declining under previous government, Tehelka.com rebounds, bolstered by reader funding.
BOMBAY Tarun Tejpal's story shows the perils and promise of muckraking journalism in modern India.
His Internet news portal, Tehelka.com, was almost hounded out of existence after rocking India's political and defense establishment three years ago with a seedy exposé of high-level corruption.
Now, bolstered by a new, friendly government and favorable expert testimony, Tehelka is back as a reader-funded weekly newspaper.
"Our victory is really a huge victory for the emerging democratic consensus in India,'' he says. "If they had been able to render us extinct, it would have been impossible for anyone to try this again.''
The Tehelka tapes, declared bona fide late last month, depicted top military officials and politicians accepting bribes - and, in some cases, prostitutes - from reporters posing as defense contractors. The news portal was crushed in an alleged government backlash, and its staff fell from 125 employees to three under the weight of police raids and a lengthy judicial inquiry.
But Tehelka emerged from the rubble - again as something new in Indian media. Tehelka.com, the well-funded Internet site, is now Tehelka, "the people's paper,'' a crusading weekly focusing on India's downtrodden and the villains who tread upon them.
While the majority of Tehelka's articles are based on straight reporting and analysis, the sting operation, Tehelka's signature, remains a potent resource. The July 10 issue was headlined: "Explosive: How Government Doctors Help You Get Rid of Your Wife."
The story and accompanying hidden-camera images showed a psychiatrist at a state mental hospital accepting 10,000 rupees, about $220, from an undercover reporter to declare a reporter's wife insane so he could divorce her. The doctor said he didn't need to examine the woman.
Tehelka is Hindi for sensation. And with its images of defense officials and party leaders pocketing stacks of money, the portal introduced India to the TV-age media scandal - Watergate with a dash of Lewinsky.
Tehelka first hit the map in 2001 with an exposé of match-fixing in professional cricket, India's national pastime. But it was the defense sting, called Operation Westend, that brought international notice.
A team led by reporter Anirudda Bahal impersonated defense contractors looking to sell thermal-imaging binoculars to the Indian Army. The team's hidden cameras showed Indians a world of middlemen, bureaucrats, and politicians taking cash, booze, and flesh for access to the procurement process. The president of the then-ruling Bharatia Janata Party (BJP) resigned after he was shown accepting cash from an undercover Tehelka reporter.
While the Indian military used the Tehelka tapes as evidence against officers involved, the politicians questioned the veracity of the tapes and attacked the journalists' ethics. When local experts said the Tehelka tapes were bona fide, the commission of inquiry sent them to a British expert for more tests. The expert came back with the same result last month.
Tehelka became the focus of the investigation. Reporters were arrested and questioned. Tehelka's financial backer, Shankar Sharma, spent 65 days in jail as investigators closed his company and pored over his books.
Aakar Patel, editor of the Bombay tabloid Mid-Day, recalls asking the former deputy prime minister, L.K. Advani, to explain the crackdown. Advani said the motive was retaliation, Patel says. "He was very up-front about it.'' Sharma says the assault "made Tehelka what it is today. It gained a lot of mass support.'' Otherwise, "it would have died a natural death.''
Even as Tehelka.com withered under legal and economic pressure, it spawned a wave of journalistic sting operations, including recent reports targeting corruption in the judiciary and the influence of cash in India's ultracompetitive school-admissions process.
One of Tehelka's more potent features highlights people savaged by the system. The paper profiled and raised money for Pankaj Giri, a tea vendor who was pushed from a moving train when he refused to pay railway police a bribe. Mr. Giri lost his legs. The officers weren't charged.
If Tehelka's legal troubles are fading, its survival on India's crowded newsstands isn't fully assured. The magazine was launched in February with weekly circulation of 150,000. While Tehelka says it's now selling 100,000 weekly copies, outside estimates have been as low as 30,000.
Whereas Tehelka the website was funded by a high-flying money manager, Tehelka the magazine is supported by some 200 founding subscribers who each gave more than $2,000.
The founding subscribers come from India's civil society elite - writers, lawyers, businessmen, and activists - who wanted to see the project survive. Tejpal, perhaps India's best-known journalist, "has been able to raise capital from dedicated readers, people of good will,'' says Patel. "There is not any precedent for it.''
Author Shobhaa De says she agreed to contribute "out of a kind of romantic nostalgia for a time when journalism meant something.... For some of us it was done with a lot of reservation. It wasn't a revenue model with any clear sort of future. But we had to support an independent voice.'
Scam takes shine off India's top brass By Sudha Ramachandran
BANGALORE - The involvement of India's top generals in a corrupt building deal worth millions of dollars has shattered the relatively clean image of the military.
The armed forces, arguably the most respected institution in the country, now seem to be taking the same path as other corruption-plagued spheres of influence just as the military prepares for a vast procurement spree.
Investigations are underway to determine how senior politicians, and bureaucrats and officers took ownership of apartments in a block constructed on Ministry of Defense-owned land for widows and war veterans of the brief 1999 Kargil war with Pakistan.
Owners of flats in the Adarsh Cooperative Housing Society, built in the upmarket Colaba area of south Mumbai, include former army chiefs General Deepak Kapoor and General Nirmal Chander Vij, former navy chief Admiral Madhvendra Singh and former army vice chief General Shantanu Choudhary.
The controversy was revealed when Admiral Sanjeev Bhasin of the Western Naval Command wrote to army headquarters and the Defense Ministry complaining that the building posed a security threat to nearby military installations. The land is located within the security perimeter of the Colaba naval base.
Originally meant to be six storeys high, the Adarsh building project instead became a 100-meter high, 31-storey structure overlooking the base. The building stands virtually on the seashore, despite coastal regulation zone laws that forbid construction in a 200-meter zone from the high-tide line of the coast.
Some years ago when journalists drew attention to the violation of security and environmental norms at the site, defense officials said civilian rules did not apply to land belonging to the military. The officials also cited humanitarian reasons, stating that the building was meant for war widows and veterans.
Kapoor and Vij have claimed they did not know the apartments were meant for war widows. It seems odd that a top general should be unaware of such a high-profile scheme.
It has emerged that Kapoor apparently bent other rules to get himself allotted an apartment in Adarsh. When he applied for the flat in 2005, the rules stated owners must have lived in Mumbai for 15 years. He quickly got himself a domicile certificate from Maharashtra chief minister Vilasrao Deshmukh. The salary slip he submitted with his application was also false.
The apartments, completed in 2008 and bought for as little as 6 million rupees (US$130,000), are now worth about 80 million rupees ($1.8 million) in Mumbai's rising real estate market, according to local media.
This is not the first time that generals have become entangled in land scams. Last year, 70 acres (28.3 hectares) of army land in Sukhna in West Bengal was sold to a private real-estate developer. Four serving generals, one of them a close aide of Kapoor, then chief of army staff, were indicted. Among the indicted was Lieutenant General P K Rath, who was then poised to take over as deputy army chief. He now faces a court-martial.
In previous decades, corruption in the armed forces took the form of simple pilfering of rations and supplies. But in the past 10 years, the scale has grown enormously, particularly with regard to the procurement of military hardware and weapons systems. What is more, it is the top brass that is increasingly being found with its hand in the cookie jar.
According to the Times of India, "at least 10 generals - of two- and three-star rank, which means major-generals and lieutenant-generals - have come under the scanner for corruption and financial misappropriation in a series of meat, ration, fuel and liquor scandals over the last few years".
Several scams have laid bare the depths to which army officers are willing to sink to make a fast buck. During the Kargil conflict, which raged between India and Pakistan across the disputed Kashmir region for three months in 1999, aluminum caskets meant to transport the bodies of dead soldiers were purchased from an American company at several times the actual cost.
Three army officials were named in the chargesheet. Soldiers, including those serving in the icy heights of the Siachen Glacier, were supplied with substandard food. Food and liquor meant for soldiers was diverted to the black market.
It seems army officers will try anything to cheat the system. They have been repeatedly found faking combat mission with an eye on cash and bravery awards. In Assam, a colonel made civilians pose in photographs as dead insurgents, their faces splashed with ketchup. In Siachen, a major and a colonel made video footage of fake killings of "enemy soldiers" in an attempt to win medals.
Unlike their more venal counterparts in the political establishment and civilian bureaucracy, military officers had generally been looked on as incorruptible. When scandals involving officers emerged over the years, they were dismissed as aberrations. The concerned officers were described as a few rotten apples. But the involvement of former army chiefs in these land scams has triggered a realization that the rot goes much deeper.
One reason why corruption has spread so deep into the armed forces is that the military is treated as a holy cow. Scrutiny is frowned on. Decision-making on military procurements is opaque and national security is often cited to brush allegations of corruption under the carpet. Those who dare to try and expose the rot in the system are labeled as dangerous troublemakers and can find themselves in legal hot water.
In 2001, when Tehelka, a news website, launched the sting operation "Operation West End" to expose corruption in high places including in defense procurement deals, it was subjected to a witch-hunt. Tehelka's founder-editor Tarun Tejpal was charged with "immoral trafficking" for offering prostitutes to defense officials during the sting operation. Tehelka's funders came under immense pressure, and were subjected to income tax raids among other things, almost ruining the company.
While Indians are willing to criticize politicians and their corruption, as slow pace of democratic institutions, the military are seen as disciplined, efficient and clean. This tendency to look on democracy with suspicion is a "hold-over from the days of Raj", Umair Ahmed Muhajir wrote recently in Outlook magazine. Taken to its extreme in India's neighbors, it has resulted in public support for military rule in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Indians might not have gone as far as in endorsing the role of the military, but it is putting the military on a pedestal and that is dangerous, Muhajir warns.
There is good reason for India to quickly stem the rot in its defense establishment. India is on the brink of what global consultancy firm KPMG describes as "one of the largest procurement cycles in the world". Between now and 2016, it expected to spend $112 billion on capital defense acquisitions. This in turn will create opportunities for Indian firms to the tune of $30 billion, KPMG said in a recent report.
Leading defense manufacturers are engaged in aggressive lobbying for lucrative contracts. Many in India's defense establishment will be keenly eyeing kickbacks. Corruption in defense procurement can be expected to surge, unless the government acts now.
The armed forces, arguably the most respected institution in the country, now seem to be taking the same path as other corruption-plagued spheres of influence just as the military prepares for a vast procurement spree.
Investigations are underway to determine how senior politicians, and bureaucrats and officers took ownership of apartments in a block constructed on Ministry of Defense-owned land for widows and war veterans of the brief 1999 Kargil war with Pakistan.
Owners of flats in the Adarsh Cooperative Housing Society, built in the upmarket Colaba area of south Mumbai, include former army chiefs General Deepak Kapoor and General Nirmal Chander Vij, former navy chief Admiral Madhvendra Singh and former army vice chief General Shantanu Choudhary.
The controversy was revealed when Admiral Sanjeev Bhasin of the Western Naval Command wrote to army headquarters and the Defense Ministry complaining that the building posed a security threat to nearby military installations. The land is located within the security perimeter of the Colaba naval base.
Originally meant to be six storeys high, the Adarsh building project instead became a 100-meter high, 31-storey structure overlooking the base. The building stands virtually on the seashore, despite coastal regulation zone laws that forbid construction in a 200-meter zone from the high-tide line of the coast.
Some years ago when journalists drew attention to the violation of security and environmental norms at the site, defense officials said civilian rules did not apply to land belonging to the military. The officials also cited humanitarian reasons, stating that the building was meant for war widows and veterans.
Kapoor and Vij have claimed they did not know the apartments were meant for war widows. It seems odd that a top general should be unaware of such a high-profile scheme.
It has emerged that Kapoor apparently bent other rules to get himself allotted an apartment in Adarsh. When he applied for the flat in 2005, the rules stated owners must have lived in Mumbai for 15 years. He quickly got himself a domicile certificate from Maharashtra chief minister Vilasrao Deshmukh. The salary slip he submitted with his application was also false.
The apartments, completed in 2008 and bought for as little as 6 million rupees (US$130,000), are now worth about 80 million rupees ($1.8 million) in Mumbai's rising real estate market, according to local media.
This is not the first time that generals have become entangled in land scams. Last year, 70 acres (28.3 hectares) of army land in Sukhna in West Bengal was sold to a private real-estate developer. Four serving generals, one of them a close aide of Kapoor, then chief of army staff, were indicted. Among the indicted was Lieutenant General P K Rath, who was then poised to take over as deputy army chief. He now faces a court-martial.
In previous decades, corruption in the armed forces took the form of simple pilfering of rations and supplies. But in the past 10 years, the scale has grown enormously, particularly with regard to the procurement of military hardware and weapons systems. What is more, it is the top brass that is increasingly being found with its hand in the cookie jar.
According to the Times of India, "at least 10 generals - of two- and three-star rank, which means major-generals and lieutenant-generals - have come under the scanner for corruption and financial misappropriation in a series of meat, ration, fuel and liquor scandals over the last few years".
Several scams have laid bare the depths to which army officers are willing to sink to make a fast buck. During the Kargil conflict, which raged between India and Pakistan across the disputed Kashmir region for three months in 1999, aluminum caskets meant to transport the bodies of dead soldiers were purchased from an American company at several times the actual cost.
Three army officials were named in the chargesheet. Soldiers, including those serving in the icy heights of the Siachen Glacier, were supplied with substandard food. Food and liquor meant for soldiers was diverted to the black market.
It seems army officers will try anything to cheat the system. They have been repeatedly found faking combat mission with an eye on cash and bravery awards. In Assam, a colonel made civilians pose in photographs as dead insurgents, their faces splashed with ketchup. In Siachen, a major and a colonel made video footage of fake killings of "enemy soldiers" in an attempt to win medals.
Unlike their more venal counterparts in the political establishment and civilian bureaucracy, military officers had generally been looked on as incorruptible. When scandals involving officers emerged over the years, they were dismissed as aberrations. The concerned officers were described as a few rotten apples. But the involvement of former army chiefs in these land scams has triggered a realization that the rot goes much deeper.
One reason why corruption has spread so deep into the armed forces is that the military is treated as a holy cow. Scrutiny is frowned on. Decision-making on military procurements is opaque and national security is often cited to brush allegations of corruption under the carpet. Those who dare to try and expose the rot in the system are labeled as dangerous troublemakers and can find themselves in legal hot water.
In 2001, when Tehelka, a news website, launched the sting operation "Operation West End" to expose corruption in high places including in defense procurement deals, it was subjected to a witch-hunt. Tehelka's founder-editor Tarun Tejpal was charged with "immoral trafficking" for offering prostitutes to defense officials during the sting operation. Tehelka's funders came under immense pressure, and were subjected to income tax raids among other things, almost ruining the company.
While Indians are willing to criticize politicians and their corruption, as slow pace of democratic institutions, the military are seen as disciplined, efficient and clean. This tendency to look on democracy with suspicion is a "hold-over from the days of Raj", Umair Ahmed Muhajir wrote recently in Outlook magazine. Taken to its extreme in India's neighbors, it has resulted in public support for military rule in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Indians might not have gone as far as in endorsing the role of the military, but it is putting the military on a pedestal and that is dangerous, Muhajir warns.
There is good reason for India to quickly stem the rot in its defense establishment. India is on the brink of what global consultancy firm KPMG describes as "one of the largest procurement cycles in the world". Between now and 2016, it expected to spend $112 billion on capital defense acquisitions. This in turn will create opportunities for Indian firms to the tune of $30 billion, KPMG said in a recent report.
Leading defense manufacturers are engaged in aggressive lobbying for lucrative contracts. Many in India's defense establishment will be keenly eyeing kickbacks. Corruption in defense procurement can be expected to surge, unless the government acts now.
Monday 8 November 2010
Tejas Mk-1 itself better than any MMRCA contender, F-35 for strike role on the mountains
Mr. Shukla, your intentions are correct in assuming that IAF needs a next generation strike fighter for close air support. But your protagonist for the same the Lockheed Martin F-35 is delusional, especially since the USAF itself will rely on A-10 for the role well into 2030, which is of an erstwhile generation.
The Last time IAF went for a ground attack plane, it chose the Saab Viggen. Got screwed by the Americans and was left with crappy choice called the Jaguar which was not much more than HF-24 marut follow on would have been, yet IAF went for the foreign plane. These didn't do much for us in Kargil, did they?
I understand the mirage2000 had to undergo ad hoc arrangements to do guided bombing, but never again had to resort to carpet bombing, Since the 7 twin-seaters were fitted with litening targetting pods with each twin seater accompanying 5 single-seaters to illuminate targets. it got the job done. Had it been adopted for the circumstance previously, it would have faced no problem to resort immediately to bombing.But procuring Mirage2000 ain't gonna happen.
Are the circumstances still revelent?
Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal, Director, CLAWS felt that there was an 80-90 per cent chance that future conflicts, if any, would break out in the mountains as a corollary of the ongoing border disputes. He felt that gaining and occupying territory and evicting the enemy from the territory occupied by them are important military objectives in future wars and only an air land battle with massive asymmetry of firepower in our favour would achieve the desired military objectives.
As of now we do have an answer atleast the start of a defining one,The threat driving the competition is a two-front war with Pakistan and China. With both states having nuclear weapons a deep-penetration strike is virtually ruled-out as per Brig Kanwal of CLAWS (Centre for Land Warfare Studies) since it would risk over-flying an enemy’s secret nuclear installations. He further says that there is an 80 percent to 90 percent probability that the next war will break out in the mountains and at least a 60 percent probability that the next war will remain limited to the mountains. In this scenario, the requirement of extended range is minimal.
Bangalore-based Aeronautics Development Establishment (ADE) has developed the guidance-kit for 1000-pound LGBs and these are designed to improve the accuracy of air-to-ground bombing by IAF
AS I've quoted the facts, I'll quote my theory, I'll fabricate my theory around Tejas mk1 Airframe & capability,IAF base with Tejas is 500 km from the front lines, the HAL Tejas Mk-1 itself has 8 hard pionts, one for for litening target designator leaves 7 for weapons station, India has developed a 1000 lb bomb, LCA Tejas's Combat load is >8,400 lbs, assuming that we fight on the borders, we have for the aircraft a ferry range of 1500 km in mk1 configuration, at full fuel 3000 litres, no external fuel tanks there can be 6 LGB on 3 pylons(multi-rack), 2 R-77 or Astra missiles on wing tip pylons 1,8 and 2 R-73 or Python 5 on 2,7, If 5 aircraft in this configuration including a Twin-seater for the commander role make up a strike unit, it would ensure a good ground strike as well as air-defence role, when they retun fleet air-defence maintained by Su-30mki will keep Chinese J-10 / J-11 at their distance from chasing Tejas squadron into Indian territory.
Direcly in competition with F-35, the Tejas in the mode I propose has 3 times as much ground Strike weapons compared to two bombs on F-35, the twin-seater could have a reconnasance/jammer pod in place of a LGB pylon to pick up forward command posts of PLA/Paki army to be obliterated in a follow on Strike with Tejas from different set of 5 aircraft from the same squadron carrying kh-59ME from a stand-off distance and in a heavier air defence configuration.
Unlike the F-35 which relies on stealth to the Hilt. Tejas has a Balanced approach to defence using Stealth and surorise elements like Visual stealth on account of smaller size, RAM coating and Variety of Missiles in the inventory.While the F-35 relies exclusively on american weapons which we have to import for every plane we import for life-time.
Finally cost, U too concede that F-35 will have to carry extrnal stores to be effective, which compromises stealth and puts it back in Tejas league. Since its stealth is compromised, attriction even in 3:1 would cost us dear if we went for F-35 than for Tejas. Not to mention all the weapons we need to import from the USA, it would still cost us royalty money if we licence produce it in contrast to astra or the 1000lbs LGB.
Hope U respond
Sunday 7 November 2010
MMRCA program to import fighter jets that squeeze into IAF gaps while Indian Aerospace industry Hollows out
For the past decade and half any news article that has come out on combat aircraft acquisition or upgrades by the Indian Air force has persumably pointed to the delay in the development of LCA programme by the ADA. While the arguement from both sides seems to be justified, the root of the problem has never been brought out by a white paper. Various prominent defence publications of Indian and foreign origin have studied the bottle-necks and have attributed it to lack of Indian design capability that should have followed the HF-24 marut programme.
The delay of Tejas was emminent even in the early 1990s. The need for immediate induction of new fighters into the armory was imperative. The initiative was the GOI's, it was started with Su-30 and Mirage 2000 as the contestants. The requirement was a multi-role fighter aircraft. The Su-30 won out using its low cost edge. Apparently the IAF took the initiative to integrate DRDO developed avionics and other subsystems to make the aircraft truly multi-role. All other equipment that were not developed were either procured from third party system integrators of Israeli or French origin or conceptualised to be made indigenously.
The induction of the Su-30 wasn't without its share of problems. The average servicibility of the 10 Su-30MKs fell to 69% during 1997-1998 and further reduced to 62% 1998-1999. Similarly, the average availability of SU-30K aircraft for operations also declined from six aircraft in 1997-98 to four aircraft in 1998-99, out of total strength of eight aircraft. This happened because the MoD did not order spares for the aircraft and the IAF was using spares supplied at the time of induction - supplied back in 1997. The MoD finally signed the general spares contract in January 1999.
Problems were multiplied due to the poor poduct support from the manufacturers. Apart from delivery of eight SU-30K aircraft during 1997 the manufacturer was required to supply 72 associated equipment like tyres, brake parachutes, specialist vehicles etc. valuing US $ 347.85 million, equivalent to Rs 1252.25 crore during 1997-2000 in a phased manner. The contract explicitly stipulated that equipment to be delivered by the manufacturer would be new, unused, of current production and serviceable. However, the a large percentage of the equipment delivered by the manufacturer between 1997 and 1998 was old, used, corroded, defective and unserviceable, though full payment had been made. For example, the specialist vehicles supplied were old, corroded and inoperable and others items like parachutes were torn and damaged. Aircraft tyres were found to have cut marks during initial inspection. The IAF made 48 claims from sukhoi but only 15 were cleared as of July 1999.
Since then with Indigenous production upto 100% the issues have come down to acceptable margins. The Kagil conflict changed the IAF perceptions considerably. Probably the only aircraft that decisevely gave the IAF a good reputation was the mirage2000. The old school belief of maintaining a fleet of Russian accompanied by europeon aircraft clicked by pure chance. Hence the IAF was convinced their multi-role fighter was the miage2000. the Su-30 multi-role initiative was abandoned and replaced with an air-superiority agenda. If the Su-30 mki could be no more than an air-superiority aircraft, there is no point in developing and integrating Brahmos bk-2 airforce version on Su-30 airframe, is there? Anyway getting back to multi-role capability. The MRCA requirement still remained unfulfilled and the lame excuse was falling squadrons. It was the IAF's lack of will and Leadership to pursue its own agenda that should be blamed for low strength of Air Force.If the IAF had endured through the Su-30 mki multi-role program, we wouldn't be calling Su-30 a swing role Elephant in the Sky, But a true Muti-role aircraft in the Class of Rafale or Euro-fighter. If u don't agree with me look at the facts,
1.the French mirage 2000 lost the competition yet thales sold equipment meant for the same fighter to Su-30 mki program, Israeli target designators would not have been required for a pure air-superiority fighter,
2.the licenced production was already starting in HAL in 2002, the IAF could have continued the program with a road-map of product development which would have progressively added multi-role capabilities for the Su-30 than go for an all new fighter plane. such have time frame would have resulted in 126 multi-role Su-30 planes getting inducted starting from a while back atleast, I read on an forum in a post which was quite convincing with factual details and now turns true, with production of original HAL orders meant to end at 2014, production has been ramped upto 26 aircraft an year. The original target was 8 per year, how much more can u under-estimate your requirements! Had IAF the tactical & strategic thought to see this, they would have never projected an MMRCA requirement?
I'll give you realtime example of Indian Air Force and Indian Navy commitiments to its initiatives, their Facebook sites
First the Navy
http://www.facebook.com/IndianNavy?v=wall
then the Air force
http://www.facebook.com/IndianNavy?v=wall#!/pages/Indian-Air-Force/41806896956
I would also like to take a barb at the Army too
http://www.facebook.com/IndianNavy?v=wall#!/pages/New-Delhi-India/Indian-Army/26242325967
When u go through the sites, u will find that even with a fan following outstripping the navy, the airforce hasn't posted an update since 2008, the Army like u is very apprehensive of China and not about its actual capabilities, now I know where u got your China Genes from and it looks to its brother IAF to bail it out in a confrontation. My apologies for calling u xenophobic had u taken it that way.
Retuning to short of fighters;when asked about falling squadrons, the IAF shoots you back with another question "where is tejas?", and our Gullible journalists and defence analysts are taken aback by some unfelt guilt and begin to patiently hear stories from IAF spokespersons like hearing stories from Grandma. They return, start making up some logic about 'falling squadrons','late tejas','heavy Su-30' and 'which is going to be medium class aircraft, where is it going to come from, the prime contestants. proS& conS etc?' This viscous cycle has generated a sterotype image throughout all branches of Security establishment & allied civilian organisations including the press that there is something called a medium class aircraft in the world and the IAF is seriously in lack of such a type and hence lacking combat capabilities.
Lets turn to the MMRCA itself, I've already quoted in previous blog reply to Ajay why there is no class difference between the mmrca contestants and Su -30 mki spare the Jas-39 and F-16. So I would Stick with a qualitative analysis. The IAF due to its itch for getting everything on board has transformed the Su-30 from a colt into an Classic Indian War Elephant. It developed requirements to import the latest mirage 2000s, ended up getting shunned by CAG and other Audit watchdogs to go for a multi-vendor competition. As Tejas development got better and better the bar was increased further and further putting already operational fighters like Mirage 2000, JAS-39 c/d and F-16 bk 52 out of the competition. With Boeing F-18 e/f and Eurofighter 2000 muscling their way into to the competion the rules preset by IAF were slowly and steadily slipping out of hand. The initiative itself was seized by the media and foreign vendors each playing up their strongest points, only to be revealed hollow and the IAF chipping in with its 2 cents to clear the air when it got too tense. Apparently slogans like "the biggest defence deal of the 21st century" ,"the wings of your nation", "100% TOT" "Omni-role" and "Strategic 5th partner in the consortium" "US-India Strategic Defence relations" made headlines than what the aircraft were actually capable of.
Honestly what did these Foreign Whachos take us for, hilly billies? All of the F-16 Bk 70 capabilities are simulated, as of today the Euro fighter has no AESA radar to offer Source codes , same goes for Rafale, the Super Hornet probably the most developed of the fighters is as huge as the Su-30 with a heavy weight penalty due to naval design, in short, it has a stubby manhood for its size But still is Super Horny for Exports. The Mig-35 well grew up along with its sibling Su-27 to a size that would typically rival it. But I hardly believe the Air Force has any genuine interest in it especially for its engines(the pakistanis want to replace JF-17 engine with a western one), after sales service record of mig-29 and even the Su-30 mentioned above.
I have also come to notice that objections from various quarters might have been there as well, without which for there could not have been so stringent compromises. These compromises have provided justification to such an uneconomical & nonsensical deal and actually made it easier for the sale to be sold to various quarters.
1.60% TOT to HAL
2.50% offset to Indian industry
3.Buying Clout - Whatever that means
4.Geo-political Advantages - yeah right
5.Engine similarity for LCA tejas
6.Help in development of LCA tejas and its radar
The practice of Technology transfer
After HAL was established completely after independence,it was envisioned to create a very vibrant aerospace industry. But starting as a military small plane manufactured, HAL has never grown beyond that. Only now with the MTA has it ventured into the useful very large category. While HAL under V.M Ghatage designed the first ab-initio trainer HT-2, somehow along the growth path it faltered.The troika of P Nilakantan, V M Ghatage and Satish Dhawan worked together on dozens of national aeronautical committees, and virtually wrote the country's aeronautical R&D agenda for the future. Ghatge held very strong views on the direction, level and pace at which the Indian aircraft industry should operate and these were at variance with those held by the policy makers of the day. His step-by-step approach to develop the day signified a definite stage in the design knowhow in the country did not find favor with government machinery as the operational arm of the defence services became more demanding and the ministry decided to rely heavily on licence production. Perhaps the champion moment of HAL was the HF-24 Marut, which was meant to announce India's entrance onto the exclusive league of nations with capability to design and manufacture airframes according to their own requirements. Due to the unavailability of a suitable powerplant, the bird never realised its potential and the Jaguar an aircraft lower than the marut's defined calibre took its place. HAL which was manufacturing Mig-21 in a production line, dedicated the line meant for a indegenous fighter bomber to Jaguar. During this duration of its exixtence, some significant developments happened the Indian Aerospace industry got completely geared towards military utility and all the work related to aeronautics were completely consolidated under HAL to avoid red tape and make logistics simpler given the efficiency of Indian public sector units. Since HAL was the totalitarian of the Indian aerospace manufacturing, it had only the choice for anything it didn't posses interms of capability or auxilary. This tendency still keeps pace today, as from the latest CAG report naming HAL Dhuruv as 90% foreign. It was promply clear with the rejection of HAL Ajeet, it was amply clear that HAL could never spearhead Indian aviation development
or it could hardly come up with a product that fit the IAF requirements. it nevertheless served as the only licence producer of Aircraft for the vast Indian military requirement raising itself to become the largest Aeronautics company of Asia. For a company which wasn't manufacturing its own design, HAL had a lot of hot gas that it built its reputation around. It was extremely gratified with all kinds of Ratnas. Two production lines Churning out aircraft continuously perhaps gave it little incentive to indegenise. India has indeed rewarded failure tremendouly so that they may be continued for generations to come. Thus it is extremely justfied to have created the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA). It may not be explicitly available in the open domain, HAL harbours animosity towards ADA in that one of the reasons for the very creation of the agency and has been authorised with power to empower industry outside HAL so that India may be built into an aviation power from the grass roots. An indirect consequence has been the release of HAL's strangehold over research, manufacturing and progressive development of the aerospace industry in India. But HAL as any other bureaucracy views it as a challenge to its exclusive turf and has not been the most enthusiastic partner of ADA's efforts or those of even the individual system suppliers like its cooperation with Samtel Display systems for Su-30 mki program, though having no contribution in terms of technolgy HAL has muscled 40% of the holding company value, not that Samtal was cash strapped. One reason that tends me to view GTRE's failure is the lack of any technology that came to companies like samtel through offsets by thales, had GTRE been the nodal agency for overseeing of technlogy transfer of AL-31FP engine to India, it might have put into it some crude technology and maybe they could have pulled atleast a functional Kaveri engine from the hat a lot earlier.
After much hussle the move to decentalise DRDO has begun in earnest, I believe the time has come to dismantle and reorganise HAL as well, as Engine unit under an independent company which works more closely with GTRE than HAL, HAL that is responsible for the overall airframe design and system integration. as well as a separate independent avionics holding company
Industry to get Off-sets worth 50% of the deal
The defence minister while articulating the goals of the MMRCA programme quoted "indian industry should be given a chance to world standards", but the logic of forcing foreign vendors to give specifications to make components that are already available is quite flawed. In most cases of offsets, defence PSU seem to have imported the raw materials assembled the system and sold it back to the Systems Integrator. Normally a defence contact after finalised goes through a life-time that requires spares and upgrades, which feed back into the overall unit cost of acquisition raising the contact by 175% considering the life time of system to be 30 years. So by this calculation itself 50% is minusle. On contast Tejas programme has begun to show real dividends, companies like Kemrock industries have built 400 tonne carbon-fibre composite manufacturing units in Gujarat with NAL developed technology, not to mention freeloader HAL that manufactures forward canards for all Su-30 now sold and Reliance is also seeking NAL technlogy to manufacture the same on a larger scale. In a world where demand for CFC is exploding 70% of this demand is met by Japan. In 2007, thw world's requirement stood at nearly 8000 tonnes which is expected to triple by 2015, with India alone accounting for 1500 tonnes for its defence needs, its uses too range widely from Agni missiles to the Saras aircraft. This is a nacent stage for the Industry, Reliance is looking to setup a 4000 tonne capacity plant and kemrock adding 1200 tonnes more. we are really at a stage to launch into the future where we can feed the aerospace industry of other nations as well, lets not spoil it by importing 70s, airframe like F-16, F-18 and Mig-35 which are still metallic all the way on contast Tejas itself is 45% cfc. Among contemperory fighters only Eurofighter with 82% compsites(70% cfc) leads tejas. If we are truly going for an airframe to give the indian industry and IAF the critical edge then MMRCA is not the way to go. Samtel Display systems has already begun supplying Multi-function displays for Su-30 mki. It is only HAl's high-handedness that prevents it from getting involved in LCA tejas programme. The Tats Strategic electronics systems no doubt can come up with a wold class jamming pod.But they have been bitten before already to favour DPSUs like ECIL and BEL.
http://frontierindia.net/iindian-tests-laser-guided-bomb-again
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/defence/8114951/UK-closes-in-on-11bn-fighter-deal.html
http://www.stratpost.com/no-f-35-for-india
The delay of Tejas was emminent even in the early 1990s. The need for immediate induction of new fighters into the armory was imperative. The initiative was the GOI's, it was started with Su-30 and Mirage 2000 as the contestants. The requirement was a multi-role fighter aircraft. The Su-30 won out using its low cost edge. Apparently the IAF took the initiative to integrate DRDO developed avionics and other subsystems to make the aircraft truly multi-role. All other equipment that were not developed were either procured from third party system integrators of Israeli or French origin or conceptualised to be made indigenously.
The induction of the Su-30 wasn't without its share of problems. The average servicibility of the 10 Su-30MKs fell to 69% during 1997-1998 and further reduced to 62% 1998-1999. Similarly, the average availability of SU-30K aircraft for operations also declined from six aircraft in 1997-98 to four aircraft in 1998-99, out of total strength of eight aircraft. This happened because the MoD did not order spares for the aircraft and the IAF was using spares supplied at the time of induction - supplied back in 1997. The MoD finally signed the general spares contract in January 1999.
Problems were multiplied due to the poor poduct support from the manufacturers. Apart from delivery of eight SU-30K aircraft during 1997 the manufacturer was required to supply 72 associated equipment like tyres, brake parachutes, specialist vehicles etc. valuing US $ 347.85 million, equivalent to Rs 1252.25 crore during 1997-2000 in a phased manner. The contract explicitly stipulated that equipment to be delivered by the manufacturer would be new, unused, of current production and serviceable. However, the a large percentage of the equipment delivered by the manufacturer between 1997 and 1998 was old, used, corroded, defective and unserviceable, though full payment had been made. For example, the specialist vehicles supplied were old, corroded and inoperable and others items like parachutes were torn and damaged. Aircraft tyres were found to have cut marks during initial inspection. The IAF made 48 claims from sukhoi but only 15 were cleared as of July 1999.
Since then with Indigenous production upto 100% the issues have come down to acceptable margins. The Kagil conflict changed the IAF perceptions considerably. Probably the only aircraft that decisevely gave the IAF a good reputation was the mirage2000. The old school belief of maintaining a fleet of Russian accompanied by europeon aircraft clicked by pure chance. Hence the IAF was convinced their multi-role fighter was the miage2000. the Su-30 multi-role initiative was abandoned and replaced with an air-superiority agenda. If the Su-30 mki could be no more than an air-superiority aircraft, there is no point in developing and integrating Brahmos bk-2 airforce version on Su-30 airframe, is there? Anyway getting back to multi-role capability. The MRCA requirement still remained unfulfilled and the lame excuse was falling squadrons. It was the IAF's lack of will and Leadership to pursue its own agenda that should be blamed for low strength of Air Force.If the IAF had endured through the Su-30 mki multi-role program, we wouldn't be calling Su-30 a swing role Elephant in the Sky, But a true Muti-role aircraft in the Class of Rafale or Euro-fighter. If u don't agree with me look at the facts,
1.the French mirage 2000 lost the competition yet thales sold equipment meant for the same fighter to Su-30 mki program, Israeli target designators would not have been required for a pure air-superiority fighter,
2.the licenced production was already starting in HAL in 2002, the IAF could have continued the program with a road-map of product development which would have progressively added multi-role capabilities for the Su-30 than go for an all new fighter plane. such have time frame would have resulted in 126 multi-role Su-30 planes getting inducted starting from a while back atleast, I read on an forum in a post which was quite convincing with factual details and now turns true, with production of original HAL orders meant to end at 2014, production has been ramped upto 26 aircraft an year. The original target was 8 per year, how much more can u under-estimate your requirements! Had IAF the tactical & strategic thought to see this, they would have never projected an MMRCA requirement?
I'll give you realtime example of Indian Air Force and Indian Navy commitiments to its initiatives, their Facebook sites
First the Navy
http://www.facebook.com/IndianNavy?v=wall
then the Air force
http://www.facebook.com/IndianNavy?v=wall#!/pages/Indian-Air-Force/41806896956
I would also like to take a barb at the Army too
http://www.facebook.com/IndianNavy?v=wall#!/pages/New-Delhi-India/Indian-Army/26242325967
When u go through the sites, u will find that even with a fan following outstripping the navy, the airforce hasn't posted an update since 2008, the Army like u is very apprehensive of China and not about its actual capabilities, now I know where u got your China Genes from and it looks to its brother IAF to bail it out in a confrontation. My apologies for calling u xenophobic had u taken it that way.
Retuning to short of fighters;when asked about falling squadrons, the IAF shoots you back with another question "where is tejas?", and our Gullible journalists and defence analysts are taken aback by some unfelt guilt and begin to patiently hear stories from IAF spokespersons like hearing stories from Grandma. They return, start making up some logic about 'falling squadrons','late tejas','heavy Su-30' and 'which is going to be medium class aircraft, where is it going to come from, the prime contestants. proS& conS etc?' This viscous cycle has generated a sterotype image throughout all branches of Security establishment & allied civilian organisations including the press that there is something called a medium class aircraft in the world and the IAF is seriously in lack of such a type and hence lacking combat capabilities.
Lets turn to the MMRCA itself, I've already quoted in previous blog reply to Ajay why there is no class difference between the mmrca contestants and Su -30 mki spare the Jas-39 and F-16. So I would Stick with a qualitative analysis. The IAF due to its itch for getting everything on board has transformed the Su-30 from a colt into an Classic Indian War Elephant. It developed requirements to import the latest mirage 2000s, ended up getting shunned by CAG and other Audit watchdogs to go for a multi-vendor competition. As Tejas development got better and better the bar was increased further and further putting already operational fighters like Mirage 2000, JAS-39 c/d and F-16 bk 52 out of the competition. With Boeing F-18 e/f and Eurofighter 2000 muscling their way into to the competion the rules preset by IAF were slowly and steadily slipping out of hand. The initiative itself was seized by the media and foreign vendors each playing up their strongest points, only to be revealed hollow and the IAF chipping in with its 2 cents to clear the air when it got too tense. Apparently slogans like "the biggest defence deal of the 21st century" ,"the wings of your nation", "100% TOT" "Omni-role" and "Strategic 5th partner in the consortium" "US-India Strategic Defence relations" made headlines than what the aircraft were actually capable of.
Honestly what did these Foreign Whachos take us for, hilly billies? All of the F-16 Bk 70 capabilities are simulated, as of today the Euro fighter has no AESA radar to offer Source codes , same goes for Rafale, the Super Hornet probably the most developed of the fighters is as huge as the Su-30 with a heavy weight penalty due to naval design, in short, it has a stubby manhood for its size But still is Super Horny for Exports. The Mig-35 well grew up along with its sibling Su-27 to a size that would typically rival it. But I hardly believe the Air Force has any genuine interest in it especially for its engines(the pakistanis want to replace JF-17 engine with a western one), after sales service record of mig-29 and even the Su-30 mentioned above.
I have also come to notice that objections from various quarters might have been there as well, without which for there could not have been so stringent compromises. These compromises have provided justification to such an uneconomical & nonsensical deal and actually made it easier for the sale to be sold to various quarters.
1.60% TOT to HAL
2.50% offset to Indian industry
3.Buying Clout - Whatever that means
4.Geo-political Advantages - yeah right
5.Engine similarity for LCA tejas
6.Help in development of LCA tejas and its radar
The practice of Technology transfer
After HAL was established completely after independence,it was envisioned to create a very vibrant aerospace industry. But starting as a military small plane manufactured, HAL has never grown beyond that. Only now with the MTA has it ventured into the useful very large category. While HAL under V.M Ghatage designed the first ab-initio trainer HT-2, somehow along the growth path it faltered.The troika of P Nilakantan, V M Ghatage and Satish Dhawan worked together on dozens of national aeronautical committees, and virtually wrote the country's aeronautical R&D agenda for the future. Ghatge held very strong views on the direction, level and pace at which the Indian aircraft industry should operate and these were at variance with those held by the policy makers of the day. His step-by-step approach to develop the day signified a definite stage in the design knowhow in the country did not find favor with government machinery as the operational arm of the defence services became more demanding and the ministry decided to rely heavily on licence production. Perhaps the champion moment of HAL was the HF-24 Marut, which was meant to announce India's entrance onto the exclusive league of nations with capability to design and manufacture airframes according to their own requirements. Due to the unavailability of a suitable powerplant, the bird never realised its potential and the Jaguar an aircraft lower than the marut's defined calibre took its place. HAL which was manufacturing Mig-21 in a production line, dedicated the line meant for a indegenous fighter bomber to Jaguar. During this duration of its exixtence, some significant developments happened the Indian Aerospace industry got completely geared towards military utility and all the work related to aeronautics were completely consolidated under HAL to avoid red tape and make logistics simpler given the efficiency of Indian public sector units. Since HAL was the totalitarian of the Indian aerospace manufacturing, it had only the choice for anything it didn't posses interms of capability or auxilary. This tendency still keeps pace today, as from the latest CAG report naming HAL Dhuruv as 90% foreign. It was promply clear with the rejection of HAL Ajeet, it was amply clear that HAL could never spearhead Indian aviation development
or it could hardly come up with a product that fit the IAF requirements. it nevertheless served as the only licence producer of Aircraft for the vast Indian military requirement raising itself to become the largest Aeronautics company of Asia. For a company which wasn't manufacturing its own design, HAL had a lot of hot gas that it built its reputation around. It was extremely gratified with all kinds of Ratnas. Two production lines Churning out aircraft continuously perhaps gave it little incentive to indegenise. India has indeed rewarded failure tremendouly so that they may be continued for generations to come. Thus it is extremely justfied to have created the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA). It may not be explicitly available in the open domain, HAL harbours animosity towards ADA in that one of the reasons for the very creation of the agency and has been authorised with power to empower industry outside HAL so that India may be built into an aviation power from the grass roots. An indirect consequence has been the release of HAL's strangehold over research, manufacturing and progressive development of the aerospace industry in India. But HAL as any other bureaucracy views it as a challenge to its exclusive turf and has not been the most enthusiastic partner of ADA's efforts or those of even the individual system suppliers like its cooperation with Samtel Display systems for Su-30 mki program, though having no contribution in terms of technolgy HAL has muscled 40% of the holding company value, not that Samtal was cash strapped. One reason that tends me to view GTRE's failure is the lack of any technology that came to companies like samtel through offsets by thales, had GTRE been the nodal agency for overseeing of technlogy transfer of AL-31FP engine to India, it might have put into it some crude technology and maybe they could have pulled atleast a functional Kaveri engine from the hat a lot earlier.
After much hussle the move to decentalise DRDO has begun in earnest, I believe the time has come to dismantle and reorganise HAL as well, as Engine unit under an independent company which works more closely with GTRE than HAL, HAL that is responsible for the overall airframe design and system integration. as well as a separate independent avionics holding company
Industry to get Off-sets worth 50% of the deal
The defence minister while articulating the goals of the MMRCA programme quoted "indian industry should be given a chance to world standards", but the logic of forcing foreign vendors to give specifications to make components that are already available is quite flawed. In most cases of offsets, defence PSU seem to have imported the raw materials assembled the system and sold it back to the Systems Integrator. Normally a defence contact after finalised goes through a life-time that requires spares and upgrades, which feed back into the overall unit cost of acquisition raising the contact by 175% considering the life time of system to be 30 years. So by this calculation itself 50% is minusle. On contast Tejas programme has begun to show real dividends, companies like Kemrock industries have built 400 tonne carbon-fibre composite manufacturing units in Gujarat with NAL developed technology, not to mention freeloader HAL that manufactures forward canards for all Su-30 now sold and Reliance is also seeking NAL technlogy to manufacture the same on a larger scale. In a world where demand for CFC is exploding 70% of this demand is met by Japan. In 2007, thw world's requirement stood at nearly 8000 tonnes which is expected to triple by 2015, with India alone accounting for 1500 tonnes for its defence needs, its uses too range widely from Agni missiles to the Saras aircraft. This is a nacent stage for the Industry, Reliance is looking to setup a 4000 tonne capacity plant and kemrock adding 1200 tonnes more. we are really at a stage to launch into the future where we can feed the aerospace industry of other nations as well, lets not spoil it by importing 70s, airframe like F-16, F-18 and Mig-35 which are still metallic all the way on contast Tejas itself is 45% cfc. Among contemperory fighters only Eurofighter with 82% compsites(70% cfc) leads tejas. If we are truly going for an airframe to give the indian industry and IAF the critical edge then MMRCA is not the way to go. Samtel Display systems has already begun supplying Multi-function displays for Su-30 mki. It is only HAl's high-handedness that prevents it from getting involved in LCA tejas programme. The Tats Strategic electronics systems no doubt can come up with a wold class jamming pod.But they have been bitten before already to favour DPSUs like ECIL and BEL.
http://frontierindia.net/iindian-tests-laser-guided-bomb-again
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/defence/8114951/UK-closes-in-on-11bn-fighter-deal.html
The Typhoon's unique advantage, he said, is an integrated platform for its weapons, radar and intelligence- gathering systems. "It has this flexibility and adaptability at any one time," he said. Sir Stephen previously headed Britain's Typhoon development programme at the Ministry of Defence.
Military history is a humanities discipline within the scope of general historical recording of armed conflict in the history of humanity, and its impact on the societies, their cultures, economies and changing intra and international relationships.
Professional historians normally concentrate on military affairs that had a major impact on the societies involved. Amateur historians often focus on personalities or the details of battles, or of the equipment and uniforms in use.
The essential subjects of military history study are the causes of war, the social and cultural foundations, military doctrine on each side, the logistics, leadership, technology, strategy, and tactics used, and how these changed over time.
I’m beginning to believe the stinging observation by many foreigners that Indians don’t know how to argue at an intellectual plane. If we disagree with an argument, we try to discredit, not disprove.
http://www.stratpost.com/no-f-35-for-india
Thursday 4 November 2010
In response to Ajay Shukla's Article "buy-fighter-for-war-not-air-shows" article - to examine if this aircraft/any other whether 4th gen or 5th gen would bring Indian Defence any tangible benefits
- Dear Mr. Shukla, I must tell u, i'm an admirer of yours. Your news always seem bang on target, from arjun of drdo to making Mr. Antony the scrape goat, that was until you quoted eurojet's bid as lowest and DRDO evaluation proved otherwise. May be you had direct access to the eurojet vendor and now he seemed to have left India in a hurry, since his company wouldn't pay his hotel bills anymore or just GOI didn't want CBI to begin an arrest, a diplomatic row with europe and another hdw scandanl. I could be way off of course. So are you in courting india to join the f-35 jsf programme instead of pursuing the mmrca competition. Perhaps its time for a reality check. To arrive at the optimal subjective and objective solution, we must analyse the facts throughly. To arrive at the proper conclusion, we may twist theories to suit facts but not facts to suit theories 1.mmrca was originally mrca, the mirage with 6 tons of payload but with western avionics, precision guided weapons and reliability was perhaps the Iaf's overwhelming choice, but unlike the DRDO and IN which had the leadership and resolve to push through sole source partnership in weapons development and procurement from Israel. IAF lacked both, initially in late 1990, the mirage was rejected in favor of the su-30 mki which the IAF now holds dear as the l1 bidder. This could have been the reason too behind CAG and other agencies involved in not giving in to the IAF and asked for requirements which may be thrown open to a competition internationally. 2. tejas flies in 2001.Fast forward 5 years, kaveri engine fails test, only basic look up and down mode of pulse doppler radar working, squadron numbers down by 6.5. the MoD has now reason enough to pursue MRCA. From the words of an IAF spokesperson whose name I don't seem to recall "when we asked for an aircraft, to bridge the shortfall in squadrons, we were told to wait for the lca tejas" this has been the prime justification for MRCA upto today. 3. I do not know if you are a passionate shiv aroor blog's follower, but perhaps this article of his might interest you http://livefist.blogspot.com/2007/03/why-isnt-hal-tejas-part-of-mrca-push.html Unlike the IN which defended the scorpene and Goskov acquisitions with full backing, the IAF has still not answered questions such as this from the media about Mmrca and tejas nor has it specified what role this new plane is meant for- Strike?- then why is there a separate weapon system operator on su-30 Mki. if prototypes such as gripen ng and mig-35 were given a chance, what did Tejas ever do to the IAF to deserve this step child treatment? 4. A sudden fetish for American due to aesa-, while the rfi was for f-16 bk52 the Us fields super viper variant. Boeing enters the run up fields the super hornet with apg-79. The rules of engagement were changed forever. Now IAF didn't just want a fighter to fill up squadrons but also a top notch plane that features the latest innovation so that they can save their ego from a future comparison of the procured aircraft with Hal tejas.
- 5.Perhaps if the IAF may not answer to the media, atleast it bears responsibility to answer the questions posed by a man in its sister service namely vice admiral Raman puri http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/newsrf.php?newsid=13702 don't mistake me for a ratshak fan, i just visit the news column. He may have been blunt on the following "the Iaf only needs updated su-30 and lca tejas" what he probably meant was use technology to enhance as much performance in collaboration with Russians for e.g to use composites to lighten the aircraft so that that its aerodynamic performance improves without the need for thrust improvemt of the engine. Already the mig-35 campaign has got its radar into this proposed upgrade. The IAF contests its stand as fighters such as rafale, eurofighter and super hornet fit inbetween su-30 mki and lca tejas in a middle tier, they must really take us for suckers. The su-27 was designed in early 1980s with huge not so fuel efficient engines deliverin thust at t/w 7-8 requiring the bird and such its lineage types such as su-30 for carrying 8 tons of payload such long distances to weigh 36 tons at max take off, its been 20 year since then carbon fibre composite and fibre glass composites have reduced aircraft weight considerably, engines have become smaller yet deliver as much power at t/w of 9-10, not to mention strict western aviation standards on fuel efficiency which results in fuel economic engines these factors combined have shrunk europeon aircraft sizes and with structural rigidity resulting from composites have low drag hence better aerodynamic performance than su-30,the rafale has too much french written all over it three loading classes, under powered omni-role, sorry there are already omni models in our roads, so no need for a flying one thank you, the french probably have outdone themselves here too. if composites developed by NAL could be used to optimise su-30 further, there isn't an iota of doubt that it would outdo its europeon peers with the much more powerful Al-31 F turbofan engine. The super hornet nearly the same as the rafale in performance by rough data, is the wrost choice there could be, except on the price front, a heavy fighter in empty weight, payload and range barely misses the max take of 30 tons and hence claims to be a medium fighter, crap. 6.Since 2001, the IAF inventory has been steadily dropping considerably. Is that a proper reason to scout for a competely new aircraft type? Lets look at a the very latest acquition programme. While the Su-30 mki was signed in nov,1996 at unit price of $ 36.55 mil and started getting inducted starting in 1997. The induction of the Su-30 was'nt without its share of problems. The average servicibility of the 10 Su-30MKs fell to 69% during 1997-1998 and further reduced to 62% 1998-1999. Similarly, the average availability of SU-30K aircraft for operations also declined from six aircraft in 1997-98 to four aircraft in 1998-99, out of total strength of eight aircraft. This happened because the MoD did not order spares for the aircraft and the IAF was using spares supplied at the time of induction - supplied back in 1997. The MoD finally signed the general spares contract in January 1999. Problems were multiplied due to the poor poduct support from the manufacturers. Apart from delivery of eight SU-30K aircraft during 1997 the manufacturer was required to supply 72 associated equipment like tyres, brake parachutes, specialist vehicles etc. valuing US $ 347.85 million, equivalent to Rs 1252.25 crore during 1997-2000 in a phased manner. The contract explicitly stipulated that equipment to be delivered by the manufacturer would be new, unused, of current production and serviceable. However, the a large percentage of the equipment delivered by the manufacturer between 1997 and 1998 was old, used, corroded, defective and unserviceable, though full payment had been made. For example, the specialist vehicles supplied were old, corroded and inoperable and others items like parachutes were torn and damaged. Aircraft tyres were found to have cut marks during initial inspection. The IAF made 48 claims from sukhoi but only 15 were cleared as of July 1999. With successful indegenisation the prombel has been stemmed within controlable margins. Being the first in the service to operate the type, the No 20's task was to develop the doctrine for the MKI’s capabilities and hence was scheduled with a lot of training flights. 'HAL' the all in all of Indian Aerospace was provided deep tot at the indian tax payers expense to manufacture the Su 30 mki under TOT, these aircraft as per Hal claims cost $ 22.5 mil Subsequently. By this time Su 30 planes were accounted to make up for 230 planes of the fleet force. HAL still has responsibilites for manufacture of all composite tail-fins and canards. Now an ad hoc order for 40 planes placed with Russia on Aug 2010 has pegged the price $ 102 per unit. Now back to the falling squadrons, When 126 planes were required immediately in 2001, we have sucessfully ordered 40 in 2010, while putting up a grand show called mmrca. One of the reasons the Su-30 program stretched so far was the lack of sub systems that needed to be developed, But since the tasks were taken on by the DRDO they could be customised with fluidity in design.And as HAL produces the Airframe completely, even tweaking it with Composites to provide it with structural strength weapons such as Brahmos could be done with relative ease and as we have unrestricted access to software codes, we could even use the aircraft as a test bed for indigenous weapons. There was even unsanctioned reports that DRDO developed AESA radar for tejas mk-2 would be part of Su 30 upgrade, But it now has been proved otherwise and that the radar would be Phazotron Zhuk AE radar.The least the platform can be used as a test bed for indigenous avionics and weapons. All these possibilities have been enabled due to the sole fact that 100% indigenisation of production has been achieved. The MMRCA is a different ball game to keep the Indian manufacturer happy 60 % tot , to issue a show cause support to domestic industry 50 % off-sets and to keep international Aircraft manufactures happy its a no holds barred competition with everyone in the fray. The only justification which IAF still held tejas was not ready was due to its lack of suitable power-plant, in testing phase and lack of Radar. With all due respect all the Fighters in the competition do have a fair share of all the above handicaps. Mig-35 and Gripen NG are prototypes, Mig-35, Super hornet and Rafale have the apt engines, the first a literally lowlife and the others with feeble power compared to their work load, the american planes are never going to share source codes of radars that makes their developed radars very much redundant, though willing to part with souce codes the Europeon Radars except for the Gripen are not even ready yet and funding itself has not been seen forthcoming and selecting the russian radar would only duplicate the Su 30's capability. While a AESA radar by French or Europeon Agencies would diversify our capabilities, it would make us hostile to pace of Europeon funding of their weapons programmes. Going by costs alone Jas -39 NG, Mig - 35 and F-16 IN might make the cut, all of them are paper planes only at their initial testing phase with the F-16 IN only in theory and Graphics. Simply put going for aleast 100 more Su -30 planes when mrca need was felt would have migitated Tejas failure risks to a larger extent. 7.An important note that is so obvious and yet rarely taken into consideration is that, accompanying any new Aircraft are fleet of Weapons and Sub systems. Due to the large size of the Su-30 order itself, the Airforce near vaccum of mordern arsenal were flooded with russian weapons. Projects such as Novator K-100 AWACS killer and R-77 were given breathers, especially since we funded the development and are the largest customers as well. The end of the cold war has almost brought growth of Europeon military industries to a standstill, heralding two decades of consolidation. Due to lack of economies of scale, per unit acquitions have shot sky high making them uncompetitive in competitions agianst both Russian and American manufacturers vying to sell weapons to third parties. The Europeon Industry too has been in a bind of late, due to trans-national consolidation the responsibility of weapons development has come to hinge on the Arms vendors themselves and not the end customers, in the eurofighterWe might have been able to bank roll a bankrupt Russia to keep up its infrastructure from falling apart. But We surely cannot pay wealthy Europeons over and over so that they may take their technological lead over us for granted. We might have been able to bank roll a bankrupt Russia to keep up its infrastructure from falling apart. But We surely cannot pay wealthy Europeons over and over so that they may take their technological capability over us for granted. Your sympathy for the army and xenophobic concern of china are getting you distracted from ground realities. 1.If the Army really is sincere about Cooperation with IAF on high altitude mountains, they could have worked with IAF to develop ground strike capabilities for the tejas, besides not Just the IAF even the USAF is filled with yesterday's ACEs in its higher echelons, who would obviosly prefer Aircraft with superb aerodynalic performance so they can keep the skies clear than be concerned about troops on ground 2.china's excusive challenge now is the F-35 soon to be procured by japan, S korea etc. So the Chinese have more than enough reason to develop capabilities especially to counter such a weapon. Obviously u have been talking too much with US business interest groups and Indian Hawks. As an average indian, I believe there is no need for us to gang up on China and i believe the average Chinese don't consider us the enemy. the chinese State will now and for a long time into the future prop up Pakistan and Pakistan will always be too happy to oblige.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)