Would Indian Air Force have worked to induct 80-120 Tejas mk-1 fighter aircraft if there was no MMRCA program?

Would Indian Air Force have worked to induct 80-120 Tejas mk-1 fighter aircraft if there was no MMRCA program? 

Tejas near IOC; but induction?

The Tejas mk-1 is nearing completion of its development. LSP-5 on its first flight had all the gizmos that are going into the production model of Tejas. The frantic pace of missile tests, countermeasures, drop tank testing and gearbox certification says that all the hardware are in place. once the developer ADA verifies their performance, LSP-7,8 will be handed to IAF for testing and Trials. In such heightened expectations, the reality tends to get blurred.
The User IAF is not going to order anymore than 20-40 Tejas mk-1 aircraft. The IAF is expecting an improved Tejas mk-2 with various next generation systems such as Indian AESA radar, new engine and other stuff. So whatever we are have developed and testing now would be no more than demonstration of technological competence. Knowing the User's past attitude towards induction of weapon systems, preferring a completely developed product to a phased upgrade approach. The platform Tejas mk-1 now is will be carried forward the same till there is any dire need for upgrade. The programmed induction of Tejas Mk-2 could suffer this same inertia hence runs the danger of being held hostile to failures in AESA, other development efforts.

MRCA requirement, developments and relevance to Tejas

By 2001, the Indian Air Force had projected a requirement for 126 multi-role combat aircrafts and approached the MOD for the mirage-2000. The proposal was shot down and told to wait for Tejas which had just made its initial flight. It was expected to fill up some 400 number of combat aircraft in IAF. Besides the IAF had just inked a deal to licence assemble 140 Su-30 mki multi-role aircrafts in HAL, during the evaluation process in which the mirage-2000 had been found to be costly but low on performance compared to Su-30. Yet seeking the same plane for another requirement was a choice that seemed prudent in IAF eyes. But not for the GOI which had further plans such as lobbying for the LFI design with Russia. But change of guard in centre and consensus with Russians on Su T-50 for PAKFA resulted in favour of acquiring a single engine fighter as MRCA to make up for shortfalls that result from prolonged Tejas development. This was the MRCA program in 2006.
Fast forward to 2010, we have Tejas program staring at IOC around Dec 2010- early 2011. But IAF is not going to order no more than 20-40 of the planes.
The reason or perhaps excuse given is redesign of air-intake, which might have taken a year or so to modify, test and certify. But add to that air show tricks sorry, combat manoeuvres cannot be performed in the present aircraft configuration; the culprit GE supplied F404 f2j3 engines that produced 50/75 KN of thrust. Anyway Kaveri Engine which was conceived to produce 13% more thrust was holding the Tejas programme to its hostage hence delinked from the initial prototypes and production models. These in turn were decided to be powered by GE F404 IN20 engines which produced 85 KN in bench testing, just as much the GTRE gtx-35vs Kaveri had hoped to achieve. IAF after this order would order no more and required the aircraft to have a new engine, which necessitated changes to fuselage, add to that larger wing with heavier load, add to that more internal fuel naturally resulting from wing and fuselage modification. All these design changes have been factored and a time frame for production has been pushed back to 2018. In a nut shell, technology that had been developed for 2010 IOC has been effectively put off till 2018, while keeping the developer busy all the while.
Below are sources that point out IAF wanted the Tejas to be better than Mirage 2000 leading to Mk-2 requirement, yet compromising for less capable MRCA way back in 2005

http://www.hindu.com/2008/12/05/stories/2008120561301400.htm
http://*************directory.blogspot.com/2010/06/lca-tejas-mk-2update.html

Is the IAF justified in making such demands on Tejas also needs to be analysed?

When it was realised that Tejas would not be available post 2005, RFI was released to generally accepted light category fighters namely F-16 bk-52, Mirage 2000, Mig-29 OVT and Jas -39 C/D Gripen. Of all the above, the only aircraft very contemporary and had a similar profile to Tejas was Gripen. Branded as cheap and affordable, the aircraft was built with the same goals Tejas was developed to meet, amazingly with the same technology needing to be developed. But Gripen induction started in 1996, while Tejas still languished for first flight. Thus procuring 126 Gripens would have been ideal. But the pace of the Indian bureaucracy meant that Tejas program caught up, confident in Tejas grew and outpaced capability that had been achieved by the four contenders. IAF finding itself in a hard place of not being able to shun Tejas from the competition did something detrimental to the very essence of quick procurement, it raised the bar. Thus the Max takeoff weight of 20 tons had to go, bringing two other manufacturers raising the competition to MMRCA. Theoretically had the IAF selected Gripen, it would have been akin to acknowledging its own lack of technical competence. As we know other than Gripen, most other aircraft were fabricated around a different engine than Tejas’s GE F404. SAAB chose F404 for Gripen, whose empty weight after development stands at 6500 kg and max takeoff weight at 12,500 kg with a combat radius of 800 km. The Aircraft has been accepted into Swedish air force. On contrast IAF wanted a 5500 kg fighter with the same engine, same take off wt and same combat radius. When Saab with all its experience has preferred to stick to 6500 kg empty weight fighter even after using 30% composites, it was not pragmatic to ask ADA to roll out an even lighter fighter of the same capabilities. Sadly IAF did exactly that and ADA with its limited experience has maxed out the weight reduction possible for a machine of this complexity, since 45% composite already employed. But IAF remains stubborn not to accept Tejas or make sensible choices that may expose its past unrealistic expectations from contemporary technology. Yes, I agree ADA was a laggard in the testing front, but that should not become a reason for continuing to rely on imports. "Of course, we have problems with our LCA but we should be working to solve that. Why should we be so keen to become dependent?" - vice admiral Raman Puri, Indian Navy. A lot has been made of DRDO’s lack of clarity in functioning, But IAF is let off the hook for not supporting indigenous programs just like that.
While in case of MRCA IAF is willing to compromise with 1970s airframe like the Super Viper, there is little doubt a latest airframe like Tejas or Gripen would prove to be superior. The last time IAF abandoned Indian programme HF-24 Marut follow on to go for Jaguar, we ended with a 1960s airframe, which became obsolete soon after induction whose original orders still languish in HAL till date. With such circumstances regularly repeating themselves, do we need foreign weapons systems that would soon be abandoned by their manufacturer once new programs start, while the IAF languishes with it for half a century in service?

Medium category aircraft the IAF so desperately lacks

The medium class of aircraft the IAF so desperately lacks. Funny that of all the Air Forces only IAF evaluates its aircraft in terms of weight instead of capabilities. Just curious, of the 600+ air staff specifications, is weighing the aircraft in a balance there, too?

yes, the Super Hornet's or Eurofighter's capabilities cannot be mimicked by Tejas, So is the same that Tejas’s low development, initial procurement and operating costs cannot be beaten by others. If there are specifically three categories heavy, medium and light, i take it we are arguing all of their capabilities are mutually exclusive. If that was the case then we are actually implying an invading Pakistani F-16 cannot be intercepted by Su-30 or tejas, if pronto F-16 was a medium category fighter. Some have argued that MMRCA is going to give us a premier strike fighter that makes me doubt if the Su-30 has any air to surface capability at all. But it seems according to wiki , we are wrong. If we still aspire to be right then the following munitions hanging from pylons are no more than stars, bells and whistles hanging from a Christmas tree.

Air to Surface Missiles:

* 3 × Kh-59ME TV guided standoff Missile, 115 km
* 3 × Kh-59MK active radar homing anti-ship missile, 285 km
* 4 × Kh-35 Anti-Ship Missile, 130 km
* 1 × PJ-10 Brahmos Supersonic Cruise Missile,300 km
* 6 × Kh-31P/A anti-radar missile, 70 km
* 6 × Kh-29T/L laser guided missile, 30 km
* 4 × S-8 rocket pods (80 unguided rockets)
* 4 × S-13 rocket pods (20 unguided rockets)

Bombs:

* 8 × KAB-500L laser guided bombs
* 3 × KAB-1500L laser guided bombs
* 8 × FAB-500T dumb bombs
* 28 × OFAB-250-270 dumb bombs
* 32 × OFAB-100-120 dumb bombs
* 8 × RBK-500 cluster bombs

The is a sense of humour in the strike capability argument, the Eurofighter Nations themselves still depend on legacy tornados for their strike role and we are offered a lethal strike aircraft in the Eurofighter.

The issue of light and heavy fighters came about first in the VVS when PFI programme was launched to counter American F-15. The program would have resulted only in Su-27, but since fielding the aircraft in large numbers was cost prohibitive, an aircraft of knocked down capability for point defence, at the lowest cost mig-29 was also developed. Similarly it was no more than pure economics that prompted the development of XF-16. The same F-16 evolved from a fighter in its inception to a venerable Fighter bomber in the 1990s. Since fielding fighters in large numbers is not a requirement for Europeans they have reduced their inventory towards a single type of aircraft. Even the United States with interests spread all over the globe, due to which it needs to acquire diverse capabilities to operate across the entire spectrum, is desperate to shift to a common platform for all its services. Please don't point out delays in JSF program, to justify MMRCA is correct. The US policy makers have made a decision and stick to it to make it work. While the GOI has left it to IAF, whose motto is "I have no satisfaction whatsoever and the sky is the limit" wake up people there is no sky, it’s an illusion. For those who believe the Semi-stealth of MMRCA is a capability, IAF rejected twin-engine LCA with semi-stealth capabilities which was called medium combat aircraft for sometime in the recent past, which should intrigue something. There is no new capability that a medium category is set to bestow upon us. There is no job that the Su-30 cannot accomplish that the MMRCA can.

How could a new generation Su-30 mki beat each and every MMRCA contender out there?

Personally, I do not believe in generations of different aircraft, or an aircraft itself belongs to a particular time and no other. Sure enough it is a good tactic to get aboard the general public. When we had the MRCA requirement of 126 aircraft, if we had commenced a programme to replace a large parts of the metal airframes with composites on Su-30 mki, with a commitment of 90 aircraft, in a sort of a Sukoi Design Bureau-NAL-HAL consortium, Even without having to change the engines we would have had a 4.75 gen Su-30MkI with frontal radar cross section (RCS) reduction comparable with Typhoon or Super Hornet yet more agile and manoeuvrable due to the raw power of AL-31 engines. The aircraft would have weighed lesser, yet with significantly greater structural strength and payload capabilities. We could say it is a 4.75 gen aircraft to fancy it, But professionals can see through these to strip every aircraft of this gimmick. Generational classification is qualitative, but weapons manufacturers use it as an advertising slogan to market their equipment to baboons in the highest echelons of decision making. Maybe the armed forces can realise it, but IAF was too stubborn to see sensibly, they were rejoicing the victory parade of the mirage 2000 and believed it was the aircraft to run over the LCA Tejas.

One reason perhaps the IAF seeks to incorporate a western origin aircraft may be due to the fact that Russian supplies of air to ground munitions flopped big time in Kargil, but the su-30 deal had already gone forward before and the IAF still preferred to have a wholly western fighter guaranteeing best of all the world in its midst. The service chiefs who strategise do not care about logistics; engineers in the IAF are burdened with the task and paying for it does not come from IAF chief’s pay check, it comes from the tax payer’s pocket. The Su-30 deal has had its share of problems, of the 40+ complaints only a handful were solved by Sukoi, is that a reason to go for a western fighter? Does not seem so after the Hawk deal, reports of French arm-twisting in supply of mirage spares. At least we had 100% TOT with Sukoi; in this deal we only get 60%. The platform whatever we buy is going to be the summation of a train wreck of problems that we faced with Jaguar, mig-27 etc.

Legacy of HAL at stake

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Bangalore through hook or crook has become South Asia's largest or perhaps the sole Aerospace enterprise, courtesy - Socialist, Spineless politicians and bureaucratic Babus. By late 1970s, after consolidation of economy by Indira Ghandi, HAL had become the alpha and omega of Indian Aerospace. It was showered with Ratna awards, its top brass regularly received national awards, but it hardly did anything to further Indian Aerospace Industry or facilitate academic institutions to participate in R&D. It was an end in itself. HAL by then had settled into a nice rhythm where first India buys some planes off the shelf from Russia then gets licence to manufacture them in HAL under Transfer of Technology(TOT), to offset the Russian leverage India again buys an aircraft with similar capabilities from Europe which is again licensed to be manufactured by HAL.
The hot gas produced by Licence production kept HAL going until ADA was formed. Instead of working with the agency, HAL considered it a challenge to its turf which meant ADA had to hire people outside HAL and kept functioning not as close as they need to have. Though the prime contractor for Tejas, until recently HAL's participation in the programme has been minimal. To maintain its Technological excellence on par with ADA, HAL has looked no further than its dirty old method of Licence production through TOT from Western Europe. I wonder what it stands to gain that the Su-30 mki licence production with 100 % TOT couldn't give, that it needs 60% TOT from MMRCA contenders. One reason could be that the idle manufacturing facility that catered to Jaguar assembly. The top to bottom hierarchy in HAL is only bent on holding onto their jobs while keeping their bigger heads intact. Probably their Cool idea is replacing Russian mig-27 line with Su-30 now Jaguar line with MMRCA to duplicate the previous cycle, how much pathetic can this agency get.
The worst part is they can't even leave upgrade programs alone, e.g. RD-33 engines for mig-29 upgrade, Jaguar upgrade. They couldn't even leave the LCA Tejas Mk-2 programme out of licensing.

Below is the extract of news that partly attributes to delays in starting Tejas Mk-2 programme

Surprisingly, or perhaps not so surprisingly, ADA has taken a year to issue the RFP. ADA officials tell The Hindu that the delay was caused because HAL butted in to say they would assemble the engines. ADA, already embarrassed by project delays was keen to procure all of them off the shelf.

Though the RFP stipulates only assembly, not license manufacture, HAL is keen to work on manufacturing technologies such as single crystal blade and blade cooling that will come with these engines. HAL of course has nothing to show as achievements for all the fighter engines that it has assembled in the past.

http://kuku.sawf.org/News/59037.aspx

An intellectual viewpoint on factors harming Tejas programme
What if the situation we find ourselves in is due to institutional inertia in which a particular lobby has thrived due to imports. The lobby toils to forge together forces from within IAF, MOD and HAL amiable to imports from western partners, thus feel their clout shrinking due to a successful Tejas programme. Since Tejas won’t die a natural death anytime soon. They are desperately trying to box out Tejas program and the medium weight category has been their brainchild. They feel their influence that derives from dealings with western military powers being threatened by Tejas’s successful induction that they have decided to muscle out Tejas using MMRCA contenders. The MMRCA was legitimate till it was MRCA, as it was realised Tejas would soon catch up with the contenders by the time of induction, the bar has been raised over and over and we can see it’s been a desperate attempt by these congregation of big headed baboons to get even with their foreign colleagues and give a sense of importance among foreign military powers using buying power, whatever that means. This is clear amateurish, sluggish short-sightedness. The nexus of forces forged by western lobby is hard-pressed to introduce a platform that is going to be outdated by 2017 according to P S Subramanian, ADA, unless we pay for AESA radar development, engine upgrade etc if not directly then through increased unit procurement costs. We are looking forward through 2020 for FGFA and 2025 for AMCA. Introducing three other platforms in-between, 2010 Tejas mk1, MMRCA in 2014 and Tejas mk-2 in 2017, is it really worth the trouble? I would rather have the aircraft make smooth transition within the ambit of the Tejas programme, Tejas aircraft in the present configuration in 2010, redesign intake for re-engine F414 Tejas in 2014, then complete the growth in 2017 with larger wings, this way the aircraft capabilities would have increased to catch up with the MMRCA candidates, on whom IAF now is prepared to spend a fortune. Induction and strategy making would be incremental as well, besides we would have a world class fighter for export as an extension of hard power, whose production can continue till AMCA production hits the lines.

As things stand now it is not the case, with a tough stance the services have taken towards developing indigenous capabilities, the industry even with the involvement of private sector would find it hard pressed to gain any share of the armed forces shopping spree expected to be $ 112 billion over the next 10 years. One reason is perhaps is the lack of ownership and responsibility bestowed upon the services by the GOI. The other day in a press statement the IAF chief declares he would accept no less than fully indigenous AESA radar for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA). Is he not aware that the AESA radar development is a co-development venture for which DRDO is in search of a foreign partner, or is he vetting out his displeasure at the joint-venture? Whatever it is, it is surely not in the Nation’s interests.

Vested Public Relations Sabotage

Even at this Twilight hour, there are vested interests that try desperately with sensationalistic and so authentically realistic propaganda to destroy the Programme's public image. But has such a thing happened in countries like Sweden, Brazil when they tried to invest in Systems that cater to their particular demand. Their achievements stand in testament to their decisions which in stark contrast to India's. Below given some of media reports during recent times,

It still will not be the fighter the air force had agreed to accept for limited squadron service. Performance specifications that the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) has not been able to attain include sustained turn rate, speed at low altitude, angle of attack and certain weapon delivery profiles. Exactly how far off the performance is from the specification remains classified.

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/awst/2010/11/22/AW_11_22_2010_p34-270650.xml&headline=LCA%20Tejas%20Falls%20Short%20 of%20Earlier%20Expectations

According to sources, the first 40 ‘Tejas’ LCA to be inducted in the Indian Armed Forces will cost roughly $33.3 million excluding its development cost. As for the development cost of the ‘Tejas’ LCA, the overall figure is to the tune of $3.8 billion which is a 3000 per cent hike from the cost during the conception of the project over two decades ago. The sanctioned cost includes the fighter’s naval variant, which will run till December 2018.

http://indiadefenceonline.com/2315/lca-faces-huge-cost-escalation/



All of these factors have led me to only a single question

Debate Question: Would IAF have worked with ADA & MOD to induct 80-120 Tejas in Mk-1 configuration if there was no MRCA alias MMRCA competition?

Some wishful thinking on my part that one or combination of the below mentioned factors topples the MMRCA program

The Gripen comes out as the one that meets all parameters and emerges L1.What if the Government was so hell bent on Tejas (or the woe-betide Sweden syndrome) that it refused to entertain an aircraft that would duplicate its capabilities.

The evaluation report is scrutinised in parliament that ends in a JPC which results in a conclusion "the capabilities afforded by the newer aircrafts are offset by their higher procurement and operating costs, thus recommends air staff to buy Mk-1 to plug gaps till mk-2 is developed"

A CAG report implicates rules had been bent and the purpose of the procurement had been compromised by waiting till 2015 to induct and with unit prices at $100+ million was unacceptable to the exchequer.

The IAF has a new chief with Engineering and operational logistics background and he  sees that Tejas programme would eventually meets its operational requirements perfectly, goes in for standardisation. IAF negotiates with the manufactures that had specific equipment that stood apart from the rest in the trials to be integrated with Tejas programme, and absolves the MMRCA to escape complexion of logistics.

           

I wish the saner heads in GOI, opposition and defence services come together to nullify the MMRCA whose decision is to come up in mid 2011 to hit the final nail on Tejas’s coffin.

yours truly

'Are we going to fight Pakistan with the US' Last updated on: October 30, 2010 00:42 IST - Vice Admiral Raman Puri asks hard questions about India-US defence ties

The Indian experience of buying weapons from America is not smooth. We have recently found problems in weapons-locating radars of the United States. The American transfer of technology means that they will build, they will sell the item and keep you on a short leash as far as spare parts and support system are concerned.

My contention is that as long as we don't have a deep political understanding with the US, it is not advisable to get into a deep defence relationship. The Asia Pacific is America's concern, but India's concern is Pakistan, Afghanistan and China. Why do we need certain defence agreements with US that give us inter-operability in far away shores?

Further, growing Indo-US defense ties suggest that the Indian government has given up on the goal of self-reliance. It is now merely a political slogan. Their excuse is lame.

They say the Defense Research and Development Organisation has not delivered. I don't think critics of the DRDO have analysed what is not delivered. There is no synergy in the ministry of defence. There is no synergy between the decision-making structures of the government. Army headquarter is one silo, the naval and air force headquarters are separate silos. The ministry of defence works on its own. There is a very loose coordination attempted at the individual level without a formal structure. There is a firewall between the production and the research side of the weapons making systems. There is hardly any mission statement from the armed forces. That doesn't come because you don't have a national security strategy and its stated goals.

'Army's shopping from the US doesn't make sense'

The Indian army's shopping from the US or Israel doesn't make sense because our army has not issued a mission statement yet. I think our so-called shopping of state-of-the-art weapons don't make sense till the National Security Council and the office of Chairman, Chief of Defense Staff function in coordination. Both these institutions are resisted or just ignored.

The Indian armed forces are apolitical; why there should not be a chief of defence staff? How will he become more powerful than politicians?

Today in cyber warfare, we don't have joint strategies of the three wings. I have seen meetings between the chiefs of the three defence wings. They don't produce any doctrines. They function on a limited agenda.

When the issue of buying of defense equipment from America comes, they talk about 'latest' and 'high technology.' These are just subjective words. What India needs is to fight efficiently with its competitors. We are not in competition with the US or Europe. We are and we should compare ourselves with our neighbours.

I have not read a professional joint mission need of Indian forces in 40 years. So, who is pushing the forces to buy such costly arms? 'Why should we go for American aircraft'

In absence of solid internal defence coordination of the three wings of the air force, army and navy, how can India sign the Communication Interoperability & Security Memorandum of Agreement, Logistics Support agreement, End Users Agreement kind of pacts with America? Some of these agreements will allow the inter-operability of Indian forces with the US, but what about inter-operability within our own forces?

If we sign such agreements with the US then we will need double set of equipments: One to read American algorithms and one to read ours. Why do we need inter-operability that the Americans want so much? Are we going to fight with Pakistan or any other country along with the US? Surely, we don't want to join American forces doing the dirty work of intervention operations? The Indian armed forces should remain independent of such tie-ups, which are not backed by political understanding of the highest order.

In my assessment all that the Indian defence forces need is updated Sukhoi- 30s and Light Combat Aircraft. We should keep modernising the LCAs; they are as good as the Mirage 2000.

Why should we go for American- made 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft? Each US-made MMRCA will cost us over $ 70 million while the LCA cost us only $ 26 million. Why should we spend so much money? Of course, we have problems with our LCA but we should be working to solve that. Why should we be so keen to become dependent? And, remember, when you build the LCA indigenously, you are building an institution.

I can say only that I disagree with my own community when they want to go for US- or Israel-made weapons and completely bind themselves with them. I know for sure that in 2003 the Air Force only wanted the Mirage 2000. Why don't you upgrade it? I think that is what the Indian Air Force needs to fight China, Pakistan or any other neighbour if need be. The Indian government doesn't have second professional advice. It is totally in the hands of service chiefs who many times don't agree with each other. That disturbs the country's research and development and upsets production infrastructure.

'India and US' political goals do not match'

In India, there is no systematic method to produce joint mission requirements. We don't draw joint technological plans with long-term perspectives. India doesn't have a technological commission to cater to needs of the defence services.

At this rate, in the long term, our dependence on the US will increase. Indian taxpayers will pay much more than what you should be paying for the capabilities being created. I think we will feel sorry when we have to use those capabilities.

Importantly, if the US and India's political goals do not match, then US made equipment capabilities will be much reduced, with problems of spare parts, upgradation and other legal restrictions on technologies.

There are many lobbies working around in New Delhi representing the British, French, Americans, Russians, etc. I believe they should not influence us. Even foreign aircraft come only after 10 or so years don't blame indigenous efforts to develop them that take that kind of time.

Second, we must see what we can afford.

Three, we should not have a fetish for state-of-the-art equipment if we can mange with what we have or what we can get with help of the DRDO. Also, is what you are buying really state of the art? I don't think so. I have seen negotiations for a few things going on for decades, still you say you are buying the latest! We have made ballistic missiles to ballistic missiles systems. I don't think there is any technology left that doesn't go into that system.

'We must promote self-reliance'

The American system of selling weapons to India under Foreign Military Sales has kept middlemen away, but I don't think it's helpful in getting access to spares and other services. I think CISMOA should be a no-go area for Indian defense services.

Being poor is no crime. But being a slave is a crime. How can you file status report to Americans under the LSA?

On one side we are losing politically when in Af-Pak policy the Americans keep India out while allowing Pakistan to have strategic depth, but still we want to sign defence agreements with them.

I agree that the US is a powerful country. We should have defence ties with it. But we must promote self-reliance. China is doing today what it wants because it's not dependent on others. You can't be even a sub-regional power if you are totally dependent on outside powers for your weapons. We can't even have military diplomacy.

Also, China's official defense budget is three times our own and their procurement costs are much lower than ours because they have much greater levels of indigenisation. So, when we are buying from abroad our needs cannot clearly help to bridge the growing asymmetries in capability. We must be cautious of the factor of affordability when planning to buy from America or any other country. We have to choose appropriate strategies to meet our mission needs and not some hypothetical 'state-of-the-art' printed in the brochure of weapons manufacturing companies.

As told to Sheela Bhatt

Project management in India involving Ministry of Defence, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Foreign aircraft manufacturer and the most important but no stake holder -Indian Air Force

Shamsher [Jaguar]

Capable of delivering nuclear weapons, the Jaguars were first inducted into the IAF from Britain in 1979 and subsequently manufactured by HAL under licence. French and Israeli companies are also part of the upgradation programme. Advanced radars, navigation, weapon and electronic warfare systems and precision-guided munitions have been fitted with these deep penetration aircraft which are poised to augment the capabilities of the blue force.
By the mid 1970s, the IAF was clearly in need of urgent re-equipment decisions. First off the mark was selection of the Jaguar strike fighter, to meet the IAF's urgent Deep Penetration Strike Aircraft (DPSA) requirement, to replace the Canberra and Hunter still soldiering on in this exacting role.
After many years of evaluation and negotiation, the Anglo-French fighter was contracted for, an interim batch of ex-RAF Jaguars being accepted to re-equip No. 14 Squadron. IAF pilots and technicians received conversion training with the RAF and British Aerospace in Lossiemouth, Coltishall and Warton before ferrying the first Jaguars to India in July 1979. These were followed by a batch of U.K. built Jaguars to re-equip No. 5 Squadron even as simultaneously, HAL prepared for production of the aircraft, its powerplants, avionics and accessories in India.
The Indian Ministry of Defense approved in October 1978 acquisition of 150 Jaguars and concluded two agreements with the aircraft manufacturer in April 1979. While 40 Jaguars were imported in a fly away condition, the remaining 110 aircraft were to be licenced manufactured by the HAL (Hindustan Aeronautics Limited) during 1982-89 in a phased manner. The direct supply aircraft were equipped with first generation Marconi inertial navigation and attack system named NAVWASS, which had low reliability and was grossly outdated. The Ministry, immediately after induction, had to sanction development of a second generation display attack ranging inertial navigation system named DARIN for its integration on HAL built Jaguars. The Ministry also sanctioned an ambitious retromodification program to upgrade the NAVWASS equipped direct supply Jaguar aircraft.
By the mid-80s, the Jaguar was in service with Nos. 5, 14, 16 and 27 Squadrons while a flight of No.6 Squadron was equipped with the Maritime Jaguar carrying the new generation Sea Eagle anti-ship sea-skimming missile. The Jaguar strike fighter was equipped also with Magic air-to-air missiles on unique overwing pylons, featured advanced nay-attack systems and able to carry formidable warload till the far ends of the sub-continent.
The Ministry curtailed in 1982 the indigenous manufacture program from 110 to 76 aircraft on the grounds that the design philosophy of the Jaguar aircraft was of the sixties and the manufacturer of the aircraft had stopped production of the aircraft. However, the Ministry had to reverse its decision and it sanctioned procurement of 15 additional Jaguars from HAL in September 1988 after six years of curtailment of the indigenous manufacture program.
The Indian Air Force had some 35 Jaguars equipped with outdated first generation navigation and attack system called NAVWASS for about two decades. Their retromodification with third generation DARIN INGPS was sanctioned belatedly in November 1996 at a cost of Rs.158 crore for completion by 2000-01 was yet to take off and was not expected to be completed before 2006. The contracts for five sub-systems with foreign vendors for this program were at a stand still due to non-finalisation of mission computer by HAL as the imported sub-systems were to be designed around this computer. In the meantime, 14 aircraft had to be grounded for periods ranging from 2 to 26 months due to prolonged unserviceability.
Air HQ in March 1995 unequivocally stated that if a retromod program was not undertaken, it would necessitate phasing out of NAVWASS Jaguars from the Air Force inventory earlier than desired due to their poor operational reliability in the present configuration. Audit scrutiny disclosed that while the Jaguar squadrons were hard pressed for NAVWASS specific items which had depleted considerably, Air HQ had decided not to procure additional NAVWASS kits stating that an upgradation program was on the anvil. The action of the Air HQ, however, proved abortive as lack of cohesive planning and foresight on its part led to grounding of 14 aircraft at a Jaguar operating base for a period ranging from 2 to 26 months as of June 2000 primarily due to deficiency and prolonged unserviceability of the NAVWASS specific items.
The Ministry concluded contract for procurement of maritime radar for the Jaguar aircraft, in replacement of the existing outdated agave radars, after four years of projection of requirement by Air Force resulting in an extra expenditure of US$ 1.12 million, which was avoidable. The Jaguar maritime fleet had to operate with old agave radars whose maintenance was becoming more and more difficult. Three out of five maritime Jaguars were lying unserviceable since March-June 1999.
Apathy of Air HQ/ Ministry to speed up the acquisition of auto pilot system for Jaguar aircraft was operationally detrimental. The Air Force not only lost four Jaguar aircraft costing Rs.141.40 crore in serious flying accidents, three pilots also died in these accidents. The auto pilots are unlikely to be fitted on Jaguars at least till June 2002.
Integration and flight trials of the laser designator pods procured at a cost of Rs.95 crore has been delayed by 20 months. This would, apart from delaying the fleet modification of Jaguars, also impose operational limitations to the aircraft fleet. In the mean time, warranty of three pods valuing Rs.15.33 crore had expired. The Jaguars would not be able to undertake missions with laser designator pods in the absence of auto pilots, a mandatory requirement was not likely to be available before June 2002.
The CCS approved a proposal of the Air Force in May 1996 for procurement of 15 laser designator pods with thermal imagery for fitment on 10 Jaguars and 5 Mirage-2000 aircraft and modification of 30 Jaguar aircraft for carrying the pods at a total cost of Rs.125 crore. The Ministry concluded a contract with foreign firm ‘D’ in November 1996 for procurement of 15 laser designator pods with thermal imagery at a total cost of US $ 27.11 million, equivalent to Rs.95 ( 1 US $ = Rs.35) crore to be delivered between March 1998 and February 1999 in two phases. Flight trails and certification of laser designator pods on Jaguar aircraft was delayed by 20 months. However, there had been delay in delivery of pods due to delays in conclusion of flight tests and certification of pods on Jaguar and Mirage-2000 aircraft. The flight test and certification on Jaguar aircraft, which was planned to be conducted by March 1998, was completed by the ASTE (Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment), only in December 1999, after a delay of 20 months.
The plan of the Air Force to equip the Jaguar fleet with self protection jammer, a critical electronic warfare equipment, has been jeopardised even after an expenditure of Rs 184 crore. An initial delay of 24 months in mock-up installation not only forced the Ministry to re-schedule the delivery of jammers from July 1999 to July 2001, a realistic time frame for fleet modification is yet to emerge affecting thereby, the operational capabilities of the Air Force.
With a Jaguar crashing in Ambala in May 2002, the Indian Air Force has lost an average of one of these deep penetration strike aircraft each year in accidents since they were inducted in service in 1979. A total of 20 Jaguars had been lost as of 2002, with the three previous crashes taking place in and around Ambala, which is the base for some of the operational Jaguar squadrons. 1999 was the worst year for the Jaguars when four of these aircraft were lost in Gorakhpur, Pune and Patiala. As of June 2005, a total of 28 Jaguars had been lost in accidents.
The Jaguars were the first type of aircraft that had flown overseas. The Indian Air Force deployed them in an overseas exercise, Cope Thunder in Alaska, USA last year. Speaking on the occasion of the induction, Defence Minister said, “The nation must equip itself for electronic warfare”. The Air Chief said that the upgradation of Jaguar was a noteworthy step towards self-reliance. HAL Chairman, Mr Ashok Baweja said Mig-27 and Sea Harrier would be upgraded next. Mr N Dharam Singh, Chief Minister of Karnataka also spoke on the occasion.
In 2004, the Indian Air Force signed a contract with Sextant to completely upgrade the Jaguar autopilot system. Sextant would supply a state-of-the-art modular, digital autopilot for the Jaguars, derived from autopilots already developed for the Mirage 2000-9 and the Nimrod 2000. Autopilot integration would be carried out in jointly with the Indian air force and HAL. The new autopilot would increase the aircraft's ground attack capabilities, as well as enhance flight safety.
Nine upgraded twin-seater Jaguar fighters were inducted into Indian Air Force (IAF) on 15 July 2005 at a ceremony held at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Bangalore. Defence Minister, Mr Pranab Mukherjee handed over the aircraft to Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal SP Tyagi. The aircraft were upgraded by HAL.
The Jaguars of the Indian Air Force have always been a trusted war horse since the first Jaguar came to Ambala on July 27, 1979 and put in 25 years of yeoman service to the Indian Air Force. At the time of induction, Jaguar was considered to be the fastest aircraft and added a new dimension to air operations in the Indian sub-continent. Under an agreement with the Indian Air Force, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has been entrusted with the upgradation of Jaguars that would extend their life by another 15 years, through the year 2020.
In January 2009 Honeywell announced its F125IN engine, a 9850lbf (43.8kN) thrust engine that will deliver high performance, improved pilot safety, lower maintenance and outstanding reliability. "This thrust class engine is built around Honeywell's proven expertise in the design and production of aircraft systems, which is evident in the F125IN engine, an outstanding propulsion system for military aircraft," said Vicki Panhuise, Honeywell Vice President, Military Aircraft. "The engine will transform the Indian Air Force Jaguar aircraft by improving mission performance, enhancing pilot safety, reducing pilot workload, and reducing maintenance events and costs." The F125IN powerplant, which is currently being considered for the Indian Air Force Jaguar re-engining program, is significantly lighter and much more powerful than the aircraft's current engine. It has an advanced dual full-authority digital engine control (FADEC) system, modular construction, integrated engine health monitoring system and best in class thrust-to-weight ratio. In 2007 the F125IN was successfully demonstrated for the Indian Air Force in Bangalore. The engine is projected to save the Indian Air Force more than Rupees 7000 Crores ($1.5 billion) in life-cycle costs compared to other upgrade options being considered. The F125IN permits the Jaguar to perform missions never before possible with the current engine.

AT EASE WITH GREASE General Deepak Kapoor may seem like a terrible aberration. But BRIJESH PANDEY finds the rot runs deeper in the army

From Tehelka Magazine, Vol 7, Issue 46, Dated November 20, 2010 CURRENT AFFAIRS   CORRUPTION AT EASE WITH GREASE General Deepak Kapoor may seem like a terrible aberration. But BRIJESH PANDEY finds the rot runs deeper in the army Caught in action When he was army chief, Gen Kapoor opened his office to wheeler dealers PHOTO: SHAILENDRA PANDEY AS THE saga of General (retd) Deepak Kapoor and Company unfolds, the nation is traumatised by the crumbling of a pillar it still believes in, by and large. Can the country still bank on this institution to keep the borders safe as well as rush in to save the day when there is a natural calamity or civil strife? Does the rot go deep or is it confined to a few aberrations? It was in 2001 that TEHELKA’s seminal exposé on corruption in defence procurement — ‘Operation Westend’ — graphically laid bare the dangerous spread of the cancer of corruption in the higher ranks of the Indian Army. But instead of launching a no-holds barred clean-up act, the establishment and the army encouraged a witch-hunt against TEHELKA. The then NDA government used the State machinery to hit back. The gunfire was clearly misdirected, for it created an enabling environment for corruption to grow, as seen in the indictment of senior officers in corruption cases in the past five years. An opportunity to put the house in order was wasted. As the decade closes, there is now a darker cloud over the army. But there is also a silver lining made up of several strands: that whistles were blown, that other officers went by the book trying to expose embezzlements, that Courts of Inquiry (CoI) scrupulously did their job, that court martials were proposed. And now, hopefully, thanks to the unsparing glare of media exposure, the establishment will fight to regain the stature and pride of place it enjoyed until a decade ago. OFFICERS, NOT GENTLEMEN The turn of the millennium has seen many scams blight the army’s image There’s a compelling reason why the defence establishment — which includes politicians, bureaucrats and military bureaucrats — needs to stop the tide of corruption. By 2015, India would have spent Rs. 2.21 lakh crore on what consultancy firm KPMG terms “one of the largest procurement cycles in the world”. Leading global defence manufacturers are flocking to Delhi for a slice of our defence spending. Indian firms too stand to gain contracts worth Rs. 44,299 crore. The scope for kickbacks and grease money are obvious. Three months ago, Patrick Choy, chief marketing officer of Singapore-based defence firm ST Kinetics, blurted out what is known as the emerging truth for foreign defence firms operating in India: “It’s come to a point where I wonder about ST Kinetics being driven out of the Indian market by frustration. We cannot simply continue with something that appears like a black hole.” His firm, reportedly blacklisted during Kapoor’s tenure, was in competition with BAE Systems for the Rs. 13,289 crore 155-mm gun contract. Kapoor has become an object of hatred for armymen and women, serving and retired, with good reason: it is said that he didn’t just pocket a few kickbacks, he allegedly invited the entire evil axis of corruption — politician-contractor-police-bureaucrat — into the office of the army chief. He did this by letting it be known within political circles that he is pliable and ready to use his office to share the spoils. Some officers blame his predecessor General NC Vij for starting the slide. A PART FROM the scope for making money under the table in equipment purchases, there is immense opportunity in the prime land owned by the armed forces, which is coveted by real estate sharks backed by politicians. This is where the defence establishment could stand firm, or succumb to the neta-broker combine. Other officers are outraged. “It hurts like hell,” says Maj Gen (retd) GD Bakshi, when asked about the Adarsh scam. In fact, when the Maharashtra government gave the building the operational certificate, Western Naval Commander Vice Admiral Sanjeev Bhasin wrote that the skyscraper poses a security threat to the nearby naval base and sought action against the promoters and officers involved since 2003. PHOTO : AFP , DEEPAK SALVI Kapoor and Vij feigning ignorance about the fact that this society was meant to house Kargil war widows did not cut much ice with their own fraternity. “A senior officer saying he didn’t know that the flats were meant for war widows? What nonsense. Then they are unfit to hold that rank,” says Major General (retd) SCN Jatar. His scepticism is borne out by facts. When Kapoor applied for the Adarsh flat in 2005, the membership rules were clear: an aspirant should have lived in Mumbai for 15 years. To get this waived, he wrote to then CM Vilasrao Deshmukh, who obliged him with a domicile certificate. His salary slip submitted with the application showed an income of only Rs. 23,450 per month. When his attention was drawn to the fake slip, he expressed surprise. Equally damningly, Trinamool Congress MP Ambika Banerjee, in a letter dated 5 August, had written to the defence minister that Kapoor had assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. “There’s a flat in Dwarka Sector 29, three flats in Gurgaon Sector 23, one flat in Gurgaon Sector 42/44, a flat in Gurgaon Phase III and a house in Lokhandwala in Mumbai,” she revealed in her letter. Kapoor had met Defence Minister AK Antony to deny this allegation. The shock of all these skeletons tumbling out is so profound that former army chief VP Malik says, “Nothing has hurt the army as much as this latest scam as far as corruption is concerned.” But the trail goes all the way back to the Sukhna land scam in which Kapoor was perceived as going soft on Lieutenant General Awdhesh Prakash, his military secretary. To recall the story: a private educational institution, Geetanjali Educational Trust, was allowed to purchase 70 acres near the 33 Corps in Sukhna. Investigations revealed the involvement of several top officers, including Lt Gen Rath, Lt Gen Halgali and Prakash. How serious was the damage can be gauged from the fact that Rath was all set to take over as deputy army chief and Prakash was one of the eight military advisors to the army chief with the most enviable charge — promotions and postings. General VK Singh, the current army chief, was then GOC-in-C of the Eastern Command and headed the COI constituted to probe charges against all four. The COI found them guilty and it recommended that Prakash be sacked. However, Kapoor stepped in and recommended that only administrative action should be taken against him. This caused so much commotion that Antony had to write a letter to the army chief asking for a court martial. That’s not all. In 2006, Maj Gen Malhotra of the Ordnance Corps floated a proposal for purchase of tents worth Rs. 16 crore. It was said in the proposal that there was an extreme shortage of tents and they should be purchased using the special financial powers of the Area Commander. The file then went to Major General General Staff (MGGS) of the Northern Command, who wrote on the file, “Are we going to spend the army’s special financial power for buying tents which are supposed to be supplied by Ordnance?” What was surprising was that three months after that rejection, Malhotra again moved a proposal recalling that he had proposed the purchase three months ago and said that the troops are suffering because of tent shortage. This time, the MGGS signed the file without a murmur. Kapoor also gave his nod. By 2015, India would have spent Rs. 2.21 lakh crore on ‘one of the largest procurement cycles in the world’ After that, Kapoor moved over to army headquarters as vice-chief. On the day Lt Gen HS Panag took over as commander, he found an anonymous note apprising him of the tent scam. On investigation, it was found that tents were not even needed. A COI under Maj Gen Sapru found that Malhotra was guilty of siphoning off Rs. 1.6 crore. Panag issued an order that would stop Malhotra’s future promotions. Panag had no idea that he had stirred a hornet’s nest — Kapoor had by that time become army chief, and ordered Panag’s transfer to the Central Command in the middle of his two-year tenure. Panag met Kapoor but was curtly told that transfers were his prerogative. Panag also met Antony. “It was clear that Kapoor was rattled but then, between an army chief and an army commander, Antony chose the chief,” a retired officer said on the condition of anonymity. This incident is cause for much heartburn in the army, as it is unusual that an army commander is moved in the middle of his tenure. Further blows were dealt to the defence establishment when the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report on defence services for the year ended March 2007 tabled in Parliament indicted the then Northern Command chief for misusing powers delegated to him for special operational requirements. TEHELKA CONTACTED Kapoor several times to get his version. On the fifth call, he refused to rebut the charges against him. “There are a lot of things going on and I would not like to comment,” he says. What a mighty fall this has been for a respected institution can be gauged from the fact that till 2002-03, the thought of court martialling an officer of the rank of major general was considered to be a rarity. In 2010, names of former chiefs are figuring in scams. The fall has been precipitate. Apart from these headline-grabbing scams of the past five years, there are others in almost every department of the army. Be it Supply Corps or Ordnance, top officers were busy siphoning off money. : • In 2006, a COI found Maj Gen Gur Iqbal Singh Multani, four brigadiers and seven other officers guilty of sale of military quota liquor in the open market. • In 2006, Lt Gen Surendra K Sahni, a major general, two brigadiers and eight other officers were found guilty of massive irregularities in procurement of ‘certain items of dry rations’ for soldiers in Jammu & Kashmir. • In 2007, a COI indicted Lt Gen SK Dahiya Brigadier DVS Vishnoi and three other officers for alleged irregularities in the operation of the ‘frozen meat contract’ for supplies to troops posted in the highaltitude Ladakh sector. • In 2009, 41 officers were found guilty of selling their ‘non-service pattern’ weapons for personal use in the grey market. So, what made these senior officers shift from first gear to fourth in such a short span, when it came to corruption? According to Maj Gen (retd) Afsar Kareem, “These kind of things happen when the top leadership is weak and corrupt. The culture is that everybody looks up. If the man on the top is clean, nobody down the ranks dare do anything. But if the chap at the top looks the other way or himself is involved, or his honesty is not fully established, he fails in every respect, be it war or peace he is not fit for the army. But by then, because they help each other, they get promotions, they get decorations and this develops a nexus if left unchecked.” Most senior army people agree that a general doesn’t become corrupt only when he attains that rank. The question that logically arises then is: How does a guy who is corrupt rise to that level? At fault is a promotion policy based on the whims and fancies of the top echelons of the military and politicians. “If you are clever and you are dishonest then you have a better chance of promotion than being honest and professionally competent, unless the people at the top recognise that and unless the government plays a part,” says Kareem. “The government generally likes to put an yes-man in that position. And the man who has much to hide is always a yes-man.” Maj Gen AK Kapur had a net worth of Rs. 41,000 when he joined the army in 1971. By 2007, his net was Rs. 5.5 crore A senior officer confirmed TEHELKA’s suspicion that the Adarsh and Sukhna land scam are merely tips of the iceberg. “The real scam happens in the procurement department,” he said. “First there is the Army Supply Corps. We have 13 lakh soldiers. Now if we spend Rs. 50 per day on one soldier’s food, the daily budget would be Rs. 6.5 crore. Imagine the kind of money involved and the potential for siphoning it off.” Then there is Ordnance, which supplies everything, from socks to weapons. Its annual budget is Rs. 8,000-10,000 crore. Tellingly, throughout 2009 the corps had no chief as the three eligible officers were facing graft charges. Maj Gen AK Kapur (according to the chargesheet), had a net worth of Rs. 41,000 when he joined the army in 1971. By 2007, his assets had grown to Rs. 5.5 crore. He owns 13 properties in Delhi, Gurgaon, Shimla and Goa. Maj Gen Anil Swarup, who was officiating commandant of the College of Materials Management, Jabalpur, has also been found guilty of irregularities in the purchase of items for a unit headed on a UN peacekeeping mission. He inflated prices, CWG style — 100-KVA generators available in the market for Rs. 7 lakh were bought for Rs. 15 lakh, cables sold for Rs. 300 were got for Rs. 2,000. The same firm that supplied shoes to a Delhi school for Rs. 700 supplied to the army for Rs. 1,200. This Rs. 100- crore loot continued from 2006 to 2008. After Supply and Ordnance comes the Military Engineering Service, which also works for the navy and air force. Its annual construction budget is at least 10,000- 12,000 crore, with buildings and airstrips perpetually under construction. In this, 10 percent commission is regarded as ‘legitimate’. All of these scams require a nexus with defence and finance ministry staff. IF THIS brazen corruption continues, soldier morale and consequently the security of the country comes under threat. “It erodes the command and control chain. After all, military leadership is inspirational,” says Maj Gen GD Bakshi. “I can’t tell a soldier: I will give you a Rs. 5,000 bonus, please go and die. But he goes and dies for a Rs. 5,000 salary because it is for the honour of his country, his unit.” A senior officer adds: “Below the rank of colonel, there is no corruption — if you leave aside procurement department or minor incidents. As people get independent, get more power, they start alignments with their bosses and this is when they are moulded as one of the corrupt lot. They don’t sign the main contract but remain in the shadow of their bosses.” Several officers believe that this rot can be stemmed in time if the army makes an example of those indicted, as it was in the Sukhna land scam. According to Maj Gen Jatar, “In my opinion they should have been stripped of rank. They have no business to be called generals and retired chiefs of the army or navy. Lower ranks must see that even former chiefs are not spared.” To get rid of the plague, serving and retired army personnel agree that it’s time for extreme action. You have to sacrifice a limb in order to save the body — otherwise, watch one of the most magnificent institutions crumble before your eyes. brijesh@tehelka.com

The White Elephant in Tajikistan

It was but four years ago that Ayni Airbase was set to become India’s first visible geopolitical move into Central Asia. What happened?
By JOSHUA KUCERA Published :1 November 2010 W HEN INDIA BEGAN RENOVATING Tajikistan’s Ayni airbase earlier in the decade, it looked set to become India’s first foreign military base, and to make Tajikistan a player in the competition among outside powers jockeying to establish outposts in Central Asia. The Indian government appeared ready to declare the base operational in 2006. In early September that year, Tajikistan’s president, Emomalii Rahmon, declared the base and its 3,200-metre runway to be open. And although information about the base is closely guarded by both the Indian and Tajik ministries of defence, it now appears that India will not use Ayni after all, depriving isolated, impoverished Tajikistan of the rent money and geopolitical clout it could have been gaining by allowing another country to use the base. And India remains without this foothold in Tajikistan, a mountainous country of about seven million, just north of Afghanistan. Tajikistan—the poorest corner of the former Soviet Union, and still unstable after a brutal civil war in the 1990s—holds a geographic position with obvious appeal to India, offering Delhi not only a strategic counterweight to Pakistan’s considerable influence in Afghanistan, but an airbase within striking distance of its troublesome neighbour. But India’s ambitions in Central Asia have been thwarted, according to many in the Tajik capital of Dushanbe, by Russia: Moscow does not want anyone else to use the base, though Tajikistan’s deteriorating relations with Russia have disinclined Dushanbe from wanting to host another Russian base in its territory. “They [members of the Tajikistan government] don’t know what to do with this airbase. We don’t need it for ourselves, but to give it to someone else would create problems with other countries,” said Faridoon Khodizoda, a political analyst in Dushanbe. The Russian Embassy in Dushanbe did not respond to requests for comment, and a spokesman at the Indian Embassy said he could not comment on Ayni, but referred questions to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Defence. They did not respond to requests for comment. India has renovated runways and hangars at Ayni, but the Indian government has never publically stated its longerterm intentions for the base. Reports in the Indian press have suggested that India hoped to base a squadron of MiG-29 fighter jets there, in an effort to bolster its clout in Central Asia and to counter Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. “Once called the white elephant of Asia, India’s strategic aspirations have now finally come of age,” wrote Shiv Aroor, an Indian journalist who obtained classified information about India’s plans in 2007. “The country’s first military base in a foreign country will be declared ready for use next month. Welcome to Ayni, Tajikistan, India’s first military outpost in a foreign land. Bare minutes from Tajikistan’s border with war-torn Afghanistan, the base gives India a footprint for the first time ever in the region’s troubled history.” Indian political analysts also raved about India’s bold foray into the strategically vital Central Asian region. “There are several reasons underpinning India’s interest in a base at Tajikistan,” wrote analyst Sudha Ramachandran in 2006. “It is close to areas where scores of camps for jihadist and anti-India terrorist groups are based, and it is in the proximity of territory where Pakistan and China are engaged in massive military co-operation. Besides, Tajikistan is in Central Asia, a gas-rich region in which India has growing interests.” Analysts of India’s military now say that those expectations may have been too ambitious. When the renovations began in 2004 and 2005, India did not have a clear plan as to how it would eventually establish a base at Ayni, according to one source close to the Indian armed forces, whose employer does not allow him to speak on the record. “The point, sadly, remains the same: while the Tajik government has kept doors open, at least in a limited sense, the government here hasn’t quite gotten its act together about precisely what or how to leverage the opportunity,” he said. Some analysts said that India’s foray into base politics was merely an attempt to act like the superpower it has not yet become. “India is playing a game,” said Imran Baig, a Washington, DC-based analyst of South Asian security. “To maintain a base with no aircraft is not expensive at all. But to deploy a high-tech fighter squadron full-time at a remote location far from the country of origin is a very, very costly affair and can only be afforded by superpowers.” Still, India appears to want to keep the question of its presence at Ayni open. India’s president, Pratibha Patil, visited Dushanbe last year, and Indian engineers continue to work on construction projects at the base, including a “hotel,” according to one worker at the base who spoke on condition of anonymity. But there were no Indian aircraft there, the worker said. Meanwhile, analysts in Dushanbe argue that Tajikistan’s government may have been courting India with the intention of playing Delhi off Moscow to exert a higher price for Russian usage of the base. Russia appears disinclined to allow India any access to the airfield. Russia’s defence minister, Anatoliy Serdyukov, said last year that Tajikistan and Russia would jointly utilise the base, but Tajikistan has never confirmed that. And Russia, which already maintains a large military base for its 201st Division at Dushanbe, does not appear interested in actually using Ayni, but merely in keeping other countries from using it, said Zafar Sufiyev, the editor-in-chief of Ozodagon, an independent weekly newspaper in Dushanbe. Neither does Tajikistan appear interested in allowing Russia to use the base. Tajikistan’s president, Emomalii Rahmon, recently suggested that Russia, which currently does not pay rent for the 201st Division base, should do so in the future. The two sides, however, agreed to put off that decision until 2014. Tajik-Russian relations have also been harmed by Moscow’s failure to support Dushanbe, either financially or diplomatically, in the construction of the Rogun Dam, which Tajikistan’s government sees as vital to its future economic security. “Rahmon is not independent enough to say ‘no’ to Russia, and he’s afraid to say ‘yes’ to anyone else,” said Saymuddin Dustov, an analyst in Dushanbe. “So he does nothing.” There has been speculation that the US, facing continuing uncertainty over the use of the Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan, might be interested in Ayni as a possible replacement. The Tajikistan government would allow the US to use Ayni at the right price, said Safiyev. “If the government gets more for it than the Americans pay for Manas, they’ll be interested,” he said. “It’s a market.” But the US has said it has no interest in using the base, and it’s not clear anymore whether India would be interested either. It appears that Russia may have made that decision for them.

The crusade of Tehelka

India's cultural elite revive muckraking magazine

After declining under previous government, Tehelka.com rebounds, bolstered by reader funding.

By Dan Morrison, Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor / July 26, 2004

BOMBAY Tarun Tejpal's story shows the perils and promise of muckraking journalism in modern India.
His Internet news portal, Tehelka.com, was almost hounded out of existence after rocking India's political and defense establishment three years ago with a seedy exposé of high-level corruption.
Now, bolstered by a new, friendly government and favorable expert testimony, Tehelka is back as a reader-funded weekly newspaper.
"Our victory is really a huge victory for the emerging democratic consensus in India,'' he says. "If they had been able to render us extinct, it would have been impossible for anyone to try this again.''
The Tehelka tapes, declared bona fide late last month, depicted top military officials and politicians accepting bribes - and, in some cases, prostitutes - from reporters posing as defense contractors. The news portal was crushed in an alleged government backlash, and its staff fell from 125 employees to three under the weight of police raids and a lengthy judicial inquiry.
But Tehelka emerged from the rubble - again as something new in Indian media. Tehelka.com, the well-funded Internet site, is now Tehelka, "the people's paper,'' a crusading weekly focusing on India's downtrodden and the villains who tread upon them.
While the majority of Tehelka's articles are based on straight reporting and analysis, the sting operation, Tehelka's signature, remains a potent resource. The July 10 issue was headlined: "Explosive: How Government Doctors Help You Get Rid of Your Wife."
The story and accompanying hidden-camera images showed a psychiatrist at a state mental hospital accepting 10,000 rupees, about $220, from an undercover reporter to declare a reporter's wife insane so he could divorce her. The doctor said he didn't need to examine the woman.
Tehelka is Hindi for sensation. And with its images of defense officials and party leaders pocketing stacks of money, the portal introduced India to the TV-age media scandal - Watergate with a dash of Lewinsky.
Tehelka first hit the map in 2001 with an exposé of match-fixing in professional cricket, India's national pastime. But it was the defense sting, called Operation Westend, that brought international notice.
A team led by reporter Anirudda Bahal impersonated defense contractors looking to sell thermal-imaging binoculars to the Indian Army. The team's hidden cameras showed Indians a world of middlemen, bureaucrats, and politicians taking cash, booze, and flesh for access to the procurement process. The president of the then-ruling Bharatia Janata Party (BJP) resigned after he was shown accepting cash from an undercover Tehelka reporter.
While the Indian military used the Tehelka tapes as evidence against officers involved, the politicians questioned the veracity of the tapes and attacked the journalists' ethics. When local experts said the Tehelka tapes were bona fide, the commission of inquiry sent them to a British expert for more tests. The expert came back with the same result last month.
Tehelka became the focus of the investigation. Reporters were arrested and questioned. Tehelka's financial backer, Shankar Sharma, spent 65 days in jail as investigators closed his company and pored over his books.
Aakar Patel, editor of the Bombay tabloid Mid-Day, recalls asking the former deputy prime minister, L.K. Advani, to explain the crackdown. Advani said the motive was retaliation, Patel says. "He was very up-front about it.'' Sharma says the assault "made Tehelka what it is today. It gained a lot of mass support.'' Otherwise, "it would have died a natural death.''
Even as Tehelka.com withered under legal and economic pressure, it spawned a wave of journalistic sting operations, including recent reports targeting corruption in the judiciary and the influence of cash in India's ultracompetitive school-admissions process.
One of Tehelka's more potent features highlights people savaged by the system. The paper profiled and raised money for Pankaj Giri, a tea vendor who was pushed from a moving train when he refused to pay railway police a bribe. Mr. Giri lost his legs. The officers weren't charged.
If Tehelka's legal troubles are fading, its survival on India's crowded newsstands isn't fully assured. The magazine was launched in February with weekly circulation of 150,000. While Tehelka says it's now selling 100,000 weekly copies, outside estimates have been as low as 30,000.
Whereas Tehelka the website was funded by a high-flying money manager, Tehelka the magazine is supported by some 200 founding subscribers who each gave more than $2,000.
The founding subscribers come from India's civil society elite - writers, lawyers, businessmen, and activists - who wanted to see the project survive. Tejpal, perhaps India's best-known journalist, "has been able to raise capital from dedicated readers, people of good will,'' says Patel. "There is not any precedent for it.''
Author Shobhaa De says she agreed to contribute "out of a kind of romantic nostalgia for a time when journalism meant something.... For some of us it was done with a lot of reservation. It wasn't a revenue model with any clear sort of future. But we had to support an independent voice.'